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This paper is an examination ot oonf1ioting v1ews
regarding

~mer1oan

defense po11oy whioh surfaoed ln a debate

durlng the winter and spring ot 1950-51 between the Truman
Adminlstration and its supporters and a group of oonserva
tiv.e Republioans.

The research prob1em lnv<?1ved unrave1ing

the debate's manlfold lssues, determlning its outoome, and
analysing the impaot of that outoome on the future ot
American foreign po11oy, part10ularly 1n Asla.
The debate's prlnoip1e issues oentered around Amerloan
defense of Europe versus defense ot Asla and the
ground troops

rathe~

than on sea and

a1~

power;

re~ianoe

on

The

-

I
I

2

Administration, while believing the United States should
help repel tbe Commun1st invasion ot South Korea, also
advooated sending additional troops to Europe.

Republican

cr1tics d1sagreed, argu1ng there Was no overt Communist
threat in

Eu~ope,

only 1n As1a, and Amerioan efforts there

Should be redoubled. 'Furthermore, they claimed that What'\:

ever detense ot Europe, .was

nec~ssary

oould best be accom-

pl1shed through the use ot naval and air power ,"not the
I

1nfantry.

I.
I

The

1mmed~ate

Adm1n1,s.tration. , A

result ot the depate was victory tor the

maJor~~y

ot s,enators was convinoed that

add1t10~al Amer1c~ troops were needed in Europe, and the

Senate passed a resolution expressing that opin1on 1n early

April, 1951, ostens1bly ending the debate.
short-11ved, however.

The v1ctory was

The debate had repercuss10ns at the

'polls in 1952 and helped sweep the Republicans 1nto ott1ce.
The ultimate outcome ot the debate was to br1ng the conservat1ve

argum~nts

to the tore and remold American toreign

po11cy so that i,t conformed to those views.

books

T~e

information used in this paper Was colleoted from

and

oQntemporary periodioals, newsp.apers, and govern-

ment publications.

The only leading conservative critic

still 'living, William F. Knowland, did not respond to a let•

ter requesting clarifioation ot statements he made during
the, debate.

The 'memoirs ot Pres1dent Truman and Dean

Acheson, his Secretary' of State, received special attent1on.

i
I
Works on and by Senator Robert A. Taft, the

~ublio

Papers o!

!he Presidents of the United States, The New York T1mes and
The Times of London, and
were_partioularl1 useful.

~~

Department ot State Bullet1n

One potentiall1 important primar,y

souroe,'Q paper written by the Nat10nal Seour1ty Oounc1l 1n

1950, remalns classit1ed and was thuB unavailable.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUOTION
_The w1nter ot 1950-51, round the United States envel
oped 1n pessimism, it not aotual despa1r.

A senae ot

impending disaster seemed to.permeate the nation.
was self-generating:
, i•

The mood

eaoh new orisis, real or tancied, pro

v1ded treSh tuel tor another outburst or national paranoia;
the tear 1n turn brewed new cr1ses.
For most Amer10ans the threat ot Commun1sm, 1n all its
myriad torms, Was somehow .responslble tor the anxiety and
susplolon whioh beset the oountry.

T.nere seemed to be no

end to the ·Oommunist conspiraoy."

From Korea oame reports

ot Amerloan armies belng Chased pell-mell down the pen

insula by Ihordes N ot Ch1nese Oommunists, a s1tuation oall
ing into questlon America's presence there in the tirst
plaoe and also presenting the nagging puzzle ot how those
likeable Chinese ever beoame disoiples ot Karl Mar.x.
The answer to that, olaimed some, oould only be tound
it the Department ot State were vigorously investigated by
proper senatorial oomm1ttees.
at Foggy Bottom.
~

I
I
I
I

, f

I
. i

perjury.

Alger Hiss had already been oonvicted ot

Owen Lattlmore had been linked vagUely with Mao

t ae-tung, and he was therefore suspeot.

I'

.,,
I

The name John

Carter Vlnoentaroused assooiations w1th the loss ot

I

Ii

Something smaoked ot treason

I

China.

l

2

And the Seoretary of State, Dean Aoheson himself,

had defended them all. IApparently, he ins1sted 'on surround-

, ,'i
I

1ng h1msel~ w1th a malignant mi11eu ot appeasers and trait~.
•

From Europe' the' news was hardly more ~pt1m1stl0.

,

Re-

ports kept indioating that the Red Army, with its 175 divisions (or was it 225?) and 30,000 tanks (or was it 45,ooo?)

was posed on the borders ot the satellites ready to strike
and expand

godles~

Western Europe.

Oommunism onto the helpless p'eoples ot

Yugoslavia, ~t was reported, Was to be

.first choioe on St'a11n I s menu

to be supported.

or

conquest.

But so would Franoo.

T1 to would have

Indeed, it could

only be expeoted that all of Western Europe would have to be
proteoted trom the onslaught.
Presumably, European manpower should proteot Europe.
As armohair strategists eagerly po1nted out, even Yugoslav1a
and Spain were not without d1visions:

the tormer reportedly

had th1rty while the latter oould scrape together twentytwo.

Further, 1t was noted that "Greece oould produoe and

was wil11ng to produoe ten divis1ons • • • • 12 And ot oourse
there was always Britain and France.

,

!
Ii

torces really be enough?
s1ons, too?

St1ll, would these

Would America have to

8uppl~'

d1vi-

But how could it, already invOlved With ASia

~.

lFor an exoellent analysis ot the Oarter affair see
Terr1ll, "When Amer10a -Lost- China: ,The Oase ot John
Carter. V1noent,· The Atlantic, November, 1969, p~. 7g-S6.

Ross

Vital
I
I

!
I

9thomas A. Dewey, "Enlarge North Atl$1lt10 Treaty,~.
Speeohes"M~~oh

1,1951, p. 292.

.

I

and the hordes ot Ch1nese Oommuh1sts 1n Korea?

From these

quest10ns emerged the framework tor a oongressional,debate
on

th~

tuture ot Amer10an tore1gn pOlloy.

Aotually, the ·great debate" as 1t oame to be,called
was really one ot a serles that began ln the 18te 1940 l s
with the Ohina questlon and continued on atterward wlth the
MacArthur hear1ngs, the
role

ot'

~emol-Matsu

Amerloan aid to Indochina.

oontroversy, and the

Although Euro,2ean

detense oomposed a large measure ot the great debate the
Far East, and'Amerioa's relat10n to 1t, ·was never tar from
:

II

I

I

I.

loenter stage.

Indeed,

tQP

some the main event was the Far

East; Europe to them remained on the periphery.

I
I

'I

Still; it' otten seemed ditf1cult to pinpoint the
nature of the debate.

Adlai Stevenson onoe suggested -it

Awas mostly a debate about m1l1tary strategy and not fore1gn
policy • • • • n3

others, With the benefit of intervening

years, have tound 1 t ,more complex,""
In short, the debates ot 1951-1952 thrashed out the
premises which would govern Amer1can foreign pollcy
tor at least the next deoade and a half. At the s1m
'plest level, the arguments'pivoted on the question ot
whether Asia should enjoy equal priority with Europe
in Amerlcan polioy. Overall, the debate was tar more
complex. It beoame a pr1me example ot how over
slmp11:t'led (often unquestioned) prem1ses ot one his
torioal era oould, almost 1nev1tably, develop into
apparently unrelated but tar-reao~g policies atteot
1n~.11te and death 1n a later era.
.
3Adlai E. Stevenson, "There Are No G1braltars,1 Vital
Speeches, February 15,1951" p.'2g7.
.
~alter LeFeber, Amerioa, Russ1a. and the Cold War,
i~~-129~ (New York: John Wiler and Sons, 1967), pp. l~g-

4
Ohronologically, it is also diftioult to Bet an exaot
date tor the beginning ot the debate.

Certa1nly the Korean

War had muoh to do w1 th 1 t • As the war began to sour tor
the Un1t.ed States 1n the autumn ot 1950, it tended to have a
oatalyt.10 ettect on national mood.

RUmb11ngs

01'

discontent

1ncreased in late November and early Deoember as Ch1nese
troops drove Amer1can torces out

,
\

01'

North Korea and caused

them to retreat well 1nto the southern port10n
1nsula.

01'

the pen

The notion the troops would be -home by Chr1stmas'

l'

qu10kly d1ss1pated and.was replaced by a wave ot deteat1sm

I

and m1strust.

, I

Much

01'

this nat10nal anxiety developed 1nto
I

a ser10us quest1on1ng ot President Truman's 1ntent10n, which
he had tirst announc'ed on September 9, to make • substant1al
1l'lere:s.ees in the strength

stat10ned 1n

Weste~

or

the United States t'oreas to 1:e

Europe in the 1nterest

01'

the detense

or that area. Q5 But the Pres1dent's ~ntent1~ns toward
orated 1n late November.

Indeed, the Chinese 1ntervention

was all the more reason to suspeot tla world-wide pattern

01'

danger to all the tree nations ••• n and, consequently, 1t
was now "more neoessary than ever that integrated torces 1n
Europe. under a Supreme Oommand be establiShed at onoe. 16 In

5u; S., Pres1dent, JlStatement by the PreSident Upon
Approving an Inorease in U.S. Forces in Western Europe~"
Sept. 9, 1950, PubliC Fa~ers 01' The Pres1dents of the united
States: Harry: S. Truman (waShington: o. 8. GOvernment
Yrlnting offioe, 1965), p. 626.
6Ibid., "The Pres1dent's News Conference ot November
30,

19~p.

72;.

'

~

-

~~--~-.;------ ~---

--

-,

\

5
m1d Deoember Seoretary of State Dean Aoheson flew to Europe
to do Just that.
In Oongress, 'however, some members reaoted to the
Korean 'imbroglio, and the President's statements oonoern1ng
the related posS1b1l1ty ot Oommun1st expans10n 1nto Western
Europf3, With something Just short of pandemon1um.

Senator

Kenneth MoKellar, Demoorat of Tennessee, and then dean of
the Senate, solemnly summed up the state of affa1rs 1n
Oongress and 1n the nat1on:
I have served 1n one or the other of the two Houses
of Con~ess to~ a per10d of nearly 40 years. Dur1ng
that long per10d of ~1me I do not believe I have ever
seen the Members ot th1s body and the Members of the
other body, or the people generally, ever work1ng at
suoh oross purposes. I do not be11ev~ I have ever
seen them so or1tioal of one another. f
McKellar h1mself was hardly an 1mpassive' bystander.
Indeed, 1n h1s View the 1ssues be1ng debated reaohed truly
momentous proport10ns:

"Shall the greatest Oonst1 tut10n

ever wr1tten and the greatest government ever dev1sed by
man· and freest and most suooessful and most prosperous
people on earth, rema1n as presently set up; or are we to
be taken over by Commun1sts who be11eve ne1ther 1n God nor
mant uS
" Senator McKellar's rhetor10 to the
lnf1dels were not yet at the gates.

I

I

I'

oon~rary,

Neverth~less,'

the
h1s

7Xenneth'MoKellar, cited by Anon., "The 'Lame Duok'
Sesslon Features Anxiety and Taxes,· Oongresslonal Dlges~,
January, 1951, p. 1.
SIbld.

-

,I
\ .. t.

'I!

11
II

. 6

[

remarks reflected the oonfusion which resulted trom a rundaand

m~ntal

str1ke'

~lagu1ng

question:

by

which gate would they

The Adm1n1stration I s response was to opt r.or a

tlex1ble derense, one that would be capable
Europe as well as Asia.

or

detend1ng

This position was decr1ed by oppo-

nents in both parties who argued that the threat 1n Europe
I

I

was remote wh1le the one 1n the Far East was real and
immediate.

I

ger, darkly h1nted at by

" i·

I

Ooupled with th1s concern was the supposed danso~e,

that a t1tth oolumn was

t

operating out ot the highest echelons ot government, and 1t

f

was responsible tor many foreign policy decisions.

!.

SuCh

views were 1n turn roundly attaoked as be1ng -isolat1onist'
by pro-Adm1nistrat1on foroes.
I

The 1solat1onist tag attached to the Admlnlst~atlonls

'" .1
" f

or1tios offered a quick and neat label, but it d1d not ade-

,

quately define the 'opposit1on's views.
v1ews

:I
I

were simply a resurgenoe

or

,To

argue that the1r

Htrad.1~t·1onal isolationism·

\

I

Histor1an

l

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. WaS more specific when he attempted

I

to catalogue the group_

t)

an earlier era--that ot Senators Norris and Lafollette, tor

I

example--tended to be "att1rmat1ve"whereas the 1solat1on1sm

I

\

I
l

•

was to be guilty of.,.mouth1ng a vague genera11ty.

I
I

1

I

He tound that the isolationism ot

ot the present per10d was found to be "negative."

He dif-

ferentiated the two by arguing that Mone was moved b~ hope
tor America, the other by hatred ot Europe."

Further, "one

shunned Europe the better to oharige America; the other, the

7 .
better to keep Amerioa trom cbang1ng. u9 "In Schlesinger's
;View, then, there was someth1ng 1nherently mor.e repugnant
about the new 1so1at1onism.
Anxiet7

ot

this sort among 11berals increased when 1t

became evident to many

01'

them that the proponents

01'

the

new is'olationism otten seemed to ofter no specific solutions
to foreign po1101 problems other than to tire away at the
hazy target 01' -traitors in WaShington. 1

\
lI

to see the ,advooates 01' the new isolat10nism following a

t

oourse that could ev~ntually lead to a "preventive" war-

t
,

Others professed

\

nuolear style.

l

they usually ta11ed to deal with the reasoning, suCh as it

I'

was, that lay behind the conservative position.

While'these v1ews may have had some valid1ty,

I
\

\
\
I

I

l

,
I
I

9Arthur M. Schlesinger4 Jr.,
The Atlantic, May, 1952, p. )5.

"The

New Isolation1sm,"

CHAPTER II:
\

THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

!rad1tiona~~oepte ot China

Muoh oonserva~1V8 thinking 1n regard to Ch1na, and
indeed allot tbe Far East, consisted o~
I : t

I

a curious blend

histor1cal ~act With a smatter1ng of Realpolitik, a generous
portion ot m1ss1onary zeal, a disoernible trace

or

nine-

I,

it

I

/' f.
f

teenth oontury bus1ness eth1c, and a s1zaable amount ot

ii

M1dwestern intuit1on.

I

l

\fJOat emerged. was a polit1cal stew ot

1
I

t

I

t

, i

I,

I

ot

contusing and questionable content.

However, since muc~ ot

'

f

th1s oonoootion had been spoon-ted the American publio tor

! .f
t

years, 1ts ingredients require a more careful examinat1on.

t

F1rst ot all, many conservat1ves simply could not--nor

i

I
I
II

f

/' !I

did they w1sh to'--shake ott·~the propensity to view AS1a,

espeo1ally Oh1na, with a speo1al nostalgic favorit1sm.

Ch1na

would always remain in their m1nds as that humble sleeping

I

t

t

j.

f

I

I

g1ant wh1ch could only be awakened by a slow and someWhat
painful transfusion of cap1tal1sm and Ohr1et1an1ty.
by

Only

follow1ng America's example would Ch1na ever progress.

This beliet was so ingra~ned in a certain segment of the
Amerioan publi0 that 1t literally beoame a torm of gospel.
Senator Kenneth T. Wherry, for example, reportedly addressed
a crowd in 19lJo:

"With God's help,

We

will 11ft Shangha1 up

9
and up, ever up, untll lt ls Just llke.Kansas 01ty.l
Whl1e dazed wonder would be the common reactlon to
such an utterance today, lt was recelved wlth "Wild cheerlng
ln 1940.

Senator Wherr,y1s exhortatlon may have been some

what ot-s classlc even tor that perlod, but lt nevertheless
reflected the type ot lntormatlon and thlnklng whloh many
Amerioans gulllbly aocepted concernlng Chlna.
Undoubtedly muoh ot thls Was due to years ot reports
sent back from Amerloan mlsslonarles ln the Orlent.

Otten,

ln tact, local churchee provlded the only 11nk between
small-town Amerlca and Obrlstl~n progress ln tar-ott;~e1a.
One authorlty has not ed:
The Far East (lnoluding southeast Asla and Indla)
absorbed more Amerlcan Protestant mlssionaries than
any other sectlon of the globe. The educatlon
carrled on through the Protestant churches of the
Unlted States to acquaint the 'supportlng constl tu
ency Wlth what was belng done g~ve to milllons lnfor
matlon, usually sympathetlc, about the peoples, c~l
tures, and problems ot eastern and southern Asla.
The tradltlonal economlc pollcles associatsd With the
"Open Door" prlnclple also helped Amerlcans to adopt a

I I

I

II, t
l

I
I

f

patronlzlng attltude toward Chlna.

Presumably, what was

good tor Amerloan buslness Was also good for Chlna, or at
least eventually would be.

Of course, Ohlnese merchants

otten resent'ed thls notlon, and ocoaslonally Amerlcan lnt er
eats suttered local re~erees when rebe1110ns broke out.
lK,enneth T. Wherry, cited by' Erlc F. Goldman, The Cru
cial Decade--and Atter (New York: Vlntage Books, 1960),

ji;-116

\

~enneth Scott Latourette, The Amerloan Record in the
Far East I 1945-1921 (New 'I.ork: T.n:eRacmlIlan oompany, 1953-).
p.

I

12.

10

St1ll, as1de trom tollow1ng a po11oy ot "gunboat diplomaoy,.
the supporters ot Amer1can 1ntereets in Oh1na'never ser1
ously suggested that Amer1ca go to war to detend those

1nter~

eats. 3 Our1ously, ~at developed as a result ot suCh th1nk
lng was 1n tact a po11cy or oontrad1ct1on.
Tang Tsou has noted:

As Professor _

"While reluctant to pay a heavy pr1ce

to promote her 1deals and to proteot her interests, the
Un1ted States was unw1ll1ng to re11nqu1sh her princ1ples and
her hope 01" tuture ga1ns. J4 Undoubtedly, th1s Was 1~ part
due to the r1se and cont1nued rule 01" the Nat10na11st reg1me
under Ch1ang Xa1-shek.

I I
}

As long as Oh1ang

rema~ned

in.power,

Amer1can eoonom10 1nterests seemed to be 1n l1ttle danger,
due 1n large part to his dependence on Amer10an a1d.
. Another Amer1can

~onoept

dur1ng World War II when most

ooncern1ng Oh1na developed
01"

the Amer10an pub11c was

if

persuaded to aooept Oh1na as a IIgreat power." .

or

oourse

Ohlna never really did belong 1n thls oategory, but such
Ir1ot1on was neoessary 1n order to 1nsure her cont1nued par
t101pat1on 1n
.and

I
i

l
,.
i

gest1ng that Ch1na would "be granted a h1gh plaoe among the
nat1ons"

j

01"

the world at the oonolus1on

01".'

the war.,S Wh1le

3Tang Tsou, Amer1oa's Fa1lure 1n Ch1na {Ch1oago:
Un1vers1ty or Chioago' Press, 1963T, p. 25.

The

~b1d.



Ij

,I .I

war aga1nst Japan. Pres1dent Roosevelt·

his Seoretary ot State even made certa1n overtures sug

t

I

t~e

1965) ,

SHerbert Fe1si The Ch1na 'Tan~le {New York:
p.

95.

Atheneum,

11
there were some off101als at h1gh levels ot government who
held ser10us reservations about the pract1cality ot suoh a
proposal, 1t was untortunately acoepted by most Amer10ans
as a sens1ble and realizable goal.

I:

I'

Th1s was part1cularly

true ot conservatives who had long been enohanted by the
poss1b111t1es ot Ch1na's rehab11itat10n and emergence as a
world power, thanks to Amer1can ta1th and know-how.
St111, there remained the occas10nal conservat1ve Who
telt that Oh1na's 1mportance lay not 1n oommerce, Chr1s
t1an1ty, nor as a potent1al great power.
1
f.

!

I

i

ot the Un1ted States 1tselt.

I

I
I

I

i

I

f

•

!. !
I
I

I,
~

Th1s 11ne ot reason1ng held that Amer1ca's.conoern tor
Ch1na should be based solely on the secur1ty cons1derat1ons

!

~I

tance to the United States lay 1n her strateg10 10cat1on.

II

, I

~

Rather, her 1mpor

A proponent ot' suoh th1nk1ng,

Representat1ve Walter Judd, argued betore the Exeout1ve
Club of Chioago in February ot 1951:
It was not necessary that they should have a good
government 1n Oh1na. That was desirable, but wholly
seoondary. It d1d not necessar1ly need to be a
demoorat10 government, an honest government, or an
eff10ient government.· The key th1ng was that the
manpower and the. reso~oe,s and the bas1s of Ohina
be under Oh1nese tr1endly to the Un1ted States, and
not under the ~ontro1 of potent1al enem1es ot the
Un1ted States. b I
Oongressman Judd's arguments are ot 1nterest tor several
reasons.

F1rst" they h1nt at some sort ot B1smarok1an

t

soph1st1oat1on, a rather strange tack tor a man who had

I

Speeohe~,

1
{

I

I

I

6Walter Judd, "How Can We Be So Stup1d"
March 1, 1951, p. 294.

V1ta~

I'

ill
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spent a good' port1on of h1s l1fe engaged as a m1ss1onary in
China.

It would norma.:L ~ be assumed that a former olergy

man would not f1nd the not1on of' a good government in China
to be a "wholly seoondary" oonsideration.

Possibly such a

disorepancy oould,be explained away by suggest1ng that
Dr. Judd's eoolesiastical interests had simply g1ven way to
a sense ot

hard-hea~ed

power poll tics.

But what seems more

llkely ls that here was an 'example 01' a pro-Chiang Republl

f

can who had beoome so worked up over the posslble fate of

t

his tavorite Asian regime that he was reduoed to employ1ng

I

argumen~s

1

Dr. Juddls concern, however, was not wlth the type or man

!

that were both oontradiotory and misle$d1ng.

ner 01' argument he used: rather, he was only lnterested ln
the United States' oontlnu1ng,to";both vlgorously support and
enoourage the actions ot Oh1ang Kai-shak.
was to become

a~.,.praQtltioner

It thls meant he

ot Realpolltik, so be It.

In

essenoe,. then, while his arguments may have added a new
degree 01' sophistry to the great debate, hls motives and
reasonlng were muCh the same as those ot other conserva

I
II

t1ves.

Unfortunately, they also reflected their weaknesses.
~~e

Hoover Thes1s

A's previously noted, opposl tion to the forelgn pollcy

I

I

ot." the Truman Administrat10n mounted steadily atter the

:I

"loss' 01' Ohlna 1n 1949-

I

it momentarlly subslded owlng to the necesslty ot support

,i
I

Wlth the advent 01' the Korean War,

ing a President and country engaged 1n an Aslan war against

13
But when 1t became clear in November ot 1950

Communism.

tbat the war 1n Korea would not be Over by Chr1stmas and the
I
(

I

J

I

I

,I
t

I
I
"

I

I
I

I

Pres1dent was ~ot go1ng to allow General MacArthur to bomb
Ch1nese targets 1n Manchur1a, "OPpos1t1on once aga1n quickly
mount ed.

It,S tempo 1ncreased even more when it became appal;.

ent that Truman was determ1ned to send add1t10nal troops to
Europe.

Its eventual high water mark Was reached on
I

Deoember 20, 1950, when rormer Pres1dent Herbert Hoover
de11vere~

\

a national radio address wh1ch 1s generally recog

nized as the open1ng salvo in the "great debate ft ot the com
ing months.

In 1t can be found many' ot the 1ssues w1th

wh1ch most or the new isolat1on1sts could read11y 1dent1ty.
A olue to Mr. Hoover's remarks can be gleaned trom his
repeated referenoes to the Un1ted States as "this Western
Hem1sphere G1braltar

01'

Western Civ111zat10n"--term1nology

that was to prov1de Adm1n1strat10n defenders with the oppor
:bun1ty to cast1gate h1m for his "fortress Amer1oa" outlook.
Bas1cally the Hoover G1bralter ph110sophy held that so long
as the Pao1f1c Odean and Japan, Formosa and the Ph1l1ppines
"

remained as one front1er, and the Atlantic Ocean (along w1th
Great Br1ta1n, "1t she w1shes to co-operate") rema1ned as
the other, the United States would be guaranteed a defense

I

I
I
f

I

posture that would be. suff1c1ent to her heeds.

To +mplement

,such ,a program, however, 1t would be necessary to lIarm our
a1r and

nava~

torces to the teeth.·

(Hoover was to add in a

later rad10 speeoh that 'th1s 'only made good sense s1nce Uthe

,

f
j

14
whole Korean tragedy is developing proot that the way to
punlBh aggressors ls rrom the air and sea and not by land
larmies.")7
to

Oonversely, slnce Amerlca would no longer need

mainta1n.la~ge

armles either on the mainland ot ASia or

'in Europe, suoh roroes should be removed.
war
: I

I

,

I

I

~slng

For any ruture

large numbers or American ground troops would

prove disastrous.

Cautioned Hoover:

We must face the tact that to commlt the sparse
ground roroes of ·the non-Oommunist natlons lnto a
land war against this Oommunist land mass would be
a war without a vlotory, a war Without a successtul
po11 t 10al t ermina 1. Any at tempt t 0 uk e War on
the Communlst mass by land,lnvaslon, through the
qulcksands ot Ohlna, Indla [,J or Western Europe ls
sheer tolly. That w~uld be the graveyard ot mll
lions ot Amerloan boys and would end. in the exhgus
t10n or this Glbraltarj at Western Clvllizat1on.
I

•

Hoover, apparently impressed by the Naz1 deteat at the
hands ot the Red Army during World War II, repeatedly warned
against American soldlers becom1:ng involved in a war agalnst
a IIKremlin-direoted horde."

This ooncern about employlng

large numbers ot American gr'ound rorces ln almo at any ruture
oontllct was Widely held by a number

01"

the Adm1nlstratlon's

opponents, '11" not by a sizeable portion or the Amerlcan pub
110 itselt.
maxim:

It became, in taot, a sort

01"

fundamental

Amerlcan "boysa in large numbers simply could not be

saor1f1ced 1n battles agalnst 1"aceless hordes capable

01"

overpowering them w1th sheer numbers alone.
7Herbert Hoover, aWe Should R~vlse Our Forelgn Pol
ioles, n yltal Speeches', February 15, 1951, p. 264..
gHerbert Hoover, "Our National Pollcies 1n this
Orls1s,· V1tal Speeches, January 1, 1951, p. 165·

,I

r.
;

•

\
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Du~ing

the coming weeks, while Hoover both modif1ed

and expanded hls thesls, many ot hls speeches cont1nued to
deal wlth the specter ot Russlan and/or Chinese hordes.
Gradually, however, the hordes were Jolned by new allles t
~

factors he referred to as "General Space, General
General Scorched Earth.n
{

attempt to engage Russ1an or

warned Hoover.

l

Some observers were to deteot another concern of

Ii
1

Hoover l s.

He seemed not only to be worrled by the strategy

of natlonal derense but also the cost ot It.

Otten lt

became dlfflcult to sort out hls prlorlt1es:

defense agalnst

\

Commun1sm or defense against excesslve defense of Communlsm.

\

At tlmes Economlc conslderatlons detln1tely won out:

I

'I

and

Chlnese armles would also have to reckon With these factors,

!

,

Any

\~1nter

l

1
l
II

II

The unbearable straln on our economlc system wlll
oome trom trylng to' do 'flve thlngs at the same time.
That ls, to malntain arm1es ln the Paolflc; to bulld
up an alr toroe; a naval torce; to furnlBh munltlons
to natlons wno are determlned to defend themselves;
and beyond that to send land armies to E~rope. Our
·economy cannot carry thls load tor long.~
The uproar over Hoover1s orlglnal speech or Deoember

l
I
t

I

t
I

20 was both lnstant and nolsy.

Admlnlstration supporters

were qulck ~o clalm that his lnterpretat10n ot what' Amerlcan
foreign pollcy should be amounted to 11ttle more than old
fashlonedr.lsolatlonlsm.

(In later weeks Hoov~r and hls

detenders were ,to be labeled "neo-lso1atlonlsts, II a term"
9Herbert.Hoover, ·We Should Revlse Our Forelgn Pol
101es," pp. 264-265.
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accordln~

to one observer, that lms

app~led

to flght ln Ohlna but not ln Europe.)lO

to those wlshlng

Dean Acheson re

marked. tbat any withdrawal of Amerlcan troops from Europe
l-tould only Itenable the Soviet Union to make a qU10k conquest
of the entire Eurasian l.a.nd mase" and,that would be "catas
trophlc to the United States. ull
.I
;

as qulck

1~

Oonservatlves were just

claim1ng Hooverl s message had been mlsinter

preteQ., perhaps intentlon,ally.

Column1st Raymond. l-!oley, for

instance, wrote it was Unot only incorrect but very danger
ous to call the Hoover plan isolatlonlsm.
that proposes an area

of.~.Amerlcan

A toreign policy

power, from the North Sea

to the Sea of Japan and from the North to the South Pole,
cannot be called burying our c.ead ln the sand. u12
1

Warmlng

to his subj ect, l-toley we:nt on to note that Hoover had also
/

I

1~.Oommun1st

made lt clear that the

emplre u was .not nearly as

secure as it appeared. In fact, it was extremely vulnerable:

lI
•

I
~I

The Red China reg~me advances its borders in weak
ness rather than in' strength. ,Its efforts to push
into southeast Asia extend its capacities to the
breaking polnt. There are hundreds of thousands of
Asiatics behind the: Red lines who can be more and
more activated by tbe vlrus of revolt. We must
flght with the underground ther~ as well as in the
Oommunist Sa telli t~s ln Europe. ~:;
10Norman A. Grae~ner, The New Isolationism (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 21.
11 1lAcheson:
1951, pp. '10-11.

J01nt Defense, It Newsweek, January 1,
I

12RaYmond Moley,/"The Hoover Oha1lenge, II ~., p, 60.
I

13:rbid.
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Here Moley struck a ohord that was to be heard again
and again throughout the great debate.

Somehow, the notion

that large-scale, ant i-Commun1st , olandest1ne aot1v1ties
were occurring beh1nd the iron and bamboo ourtains became
widely aocepted by the ,American R1ght.

Yet wh'1le conserva

t1ves placed a great amount ot ta1,th in th1s belief, they
could never

mus~er

such' a thesis.

up any hard ev1denoe which m1ght support

Reterences such as Moley' s about aid1ng

·underground" aot1v1ty were constantly being made, but most
of them dealt With general1t1es w1th
t10na as to

'j

i~plementation.

te~

specific

~ugges

Many ot the proposals were

based more on a sense ot romant1cism than realism.

Where

!

they

t

's1mply based upon the propaganda ot refugee groups sueb as

,I

I \
1

I

i'
I

the

or1gin~ted.1s

N~t1onal1sts

hardly a mystery; many ot them were

on Taiwan.

Chiang's government, in partia-

ular, was noteworthy in its attempts to conv1nce the Un1ted
States that guertlla-in1t1ated actions were occurring w1th
1noreas1ng frequency on the ma1nland.

Aga1n, proof ot this

was unobtainable, but laCk of 1t never troubled the true
believers of Ohiang in Amer1ca.
Zero1ng 1n on Acheson
As they sought to detend Hoover and his fore1gn policy
propos~lS. ~any conservat1ves sear~hed tor a ~eak l1nk 1n

the Adm1nistrat1on f s armor. .In 'Secretary ot State Dean
Aobeson they

fel~

they found 1t, and by Deeember ot 1950 the

I'

I

is
Secretar,y was being subjected to increas1ngly v1rulent

··

,

attacks from the Rignt.

I

As dis1l1usionment with foreign

polley lncreased, even more.moderate conservatlves began to
vlew hlm as the prime'v11la1n in the Truman Adminlstrat1on.
Be became the soapegoat tor Admin istratlon or1t1cs because
as one observer not,ed, "he Was the easiest target in sight. H
Aside trom p6lioy dec1sions alone, his ver,y charaoter seemed
reason enough to

~norease

the invective.

onslaught, one historian has noted:

Ooncern1ng this

"His personal1ty, his

genteel New England background, his faultless groom1ng (one
Oongressman habitually referred to him as 'that goddamn

I,i

tloorwalker'), h1s air ot aristocrat1c detachment, and hls
intelleotual superiority made h1m superbly vulnerable. Hl4 In
other words, not only Was Acheson a weak and reckless l1b
eral, to many he was also a stuck-up snob.

A more "ant1

t

Amerio~1I

i

taot, therel, seems li tt le doubt that in the eyes ot his

oar1oature would be ditflcult to imagine.

In

I·

domest10 enemies, Aoheson assumed the proportions of an

.I

Amerlcan Ohamberla1n.

f

leading Amer1can diplomacy through one Mun10h atter another.

I
II

And, 11ke

I

"appeasement. U

I
1
l
l

~

It
t

I
I,

Similarly, he would be aocused ot

Ohamberla~n,

he would be denounced tor practic1ng

In a very real sense the semantics ot these attaoks
beoame more important than the attacks themselves.

"Appease

ment" emerged as the best examp;Le; it seemed the only lesson
l4Graebner,· p.

65.

:::.

I

I
'

('
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,the American Right 1 earned trom World War II was the use or
this term.

,Nevertheless, trom lts use the Right Was able to

squeeze an enormous amount 01" political mlleage.
employed in oonjunotion with an

attac~

I

I

'

When

on Acheson. it was,

effeotive in oonjur1ng up the lmage 01" a dapper and debonair
I

dlplomat bowlng and soraping betore a leerlng Communist

i

bully.

!

I
;

,.
I
I
)

,

Consequently', many ,,Americans were conditioned into

assumlng that China was "lost" ln 1949 beoause

o't

"appease

ment l and the rest 01" ASia would go the same way unless the
spineless Acheson were removed trom ottlce.

Even Hoover 1n

h1s speeoh managed to matter-ot-taotly insert lt, oautlon
lng, "We should have none 01"

~ppeasement.n

HAppeaseme~t.·

"then, became an oyerworked but lncredibly potent politioal
shibboleth tor arous1ng 1ndignat10n at Admlnlstratlon policy

,

under Acheson's oontrol.

A

The attacks agalnst him acoelerated at such a clip
that the Presldent was torced vlgorously to defend his Sec
retary at a press conterence ln Deoember:
These reoent attacks on Mr. Acheson are old, ln the
sense that they are the same talse oharges--and I
emphasize that talse oharges--that have been made
time and again over a perlod 01" months. They have
no bas1s in tact whatever.
It l's the same thlng that happened to Seward. Pres
ldent Llnooln was asked by a group 01" Republloans to
dismlss Secretary 01" State Seward. He reiPsed. So
do I retuse to dlsmlss Seoretary Acheson. ~
I

I
,

'

, I

I

15u. 5., Presldent, "The Presldent I s News Oonterenoe,
Deoember 19, 1950," .Pub110 Pa12srs of The Presldents of
the United States: HarrfS. Truman (Wash1ngton: U. s.
GOvernment Printing atfioe, 1965), p. 751.
01"

/'

''II
I

,
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i

I

,

While h1s allusion to Lincoln was overdrawn, Truman I s

!. .

trust ln the ablllty of his Seoretary ot State was unshak
able.

He knew Aoheson to be both loyal and hard worklng.

Moreover, he felt that even wlth ACheson gone the debate
would oont1nue.

In Truman's vlew the oonservatives .wantsd

Aoheson's scalp beoause he stood tor ! l pOlicy.M16 Much

01'

this Hsoalp bunting" frankly perplexed the President, and be
was later to wonder'what had happened to the

})~l.partlsanshlp

approaoh to foreign policy that had prevalled When Arthur
,

I

Vandenberg had spoken for the Republloan

.~arty.

Slnce Van

denberg's death, Truman found it dlstresslng to note ln the

i

Republloan party nthe rlse of a faotlon • • • that seemed to

I

know no approach to government
nounoe, and to negate. 117

i

-~

~xoept

to belittle, to de

Ii

{.
I

"The

I
i

, I
t
II

It
. I.
~

I

~enator

From Formosa ft

Iii
The voloe

01'

Republican Senator Wllllam F. Knowland

Oalifornia was to emerge as one
ten~

01'

'01'

the most vocal and persis

ln deploring and denounclng the. foreign policy or the

Truman Administration.
unofficial

prol~outor

~nowland

gradually beol;UIle the

tor the Republioan Party on the sub

Jeot ot Far Eastern atfairs, and next to Senators Tart and
Whe~y,

he probably headed the llst

o~

Truman's "lrrespons1ble

l~arry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden 01ty:

Oompany, Ina., 1956), II,

430.

Doubleday
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raotlon."

Whlle most ot hls senatorlal oolleagues devoted a

good portlon ot their'etforts to disousslng the questlon ot
European detense,

Know~and

llmlted most ot h1s to Asla.

In

the Senator's mind, Asia was oertainly no mere backwater;

.

1ndeed, he often proolaimed that the tuture ot Europe was

\
I'I
\

olearly dependent on the

co~se

ot events 1n the Far East.

t

Be was tond ot quoting what he termed Len1n's Dsound obser

t

vatlrm" 'that lithe road to Parls 1s through Pelplng. ulS
Taotically, Knowland has to- be given oredlt tor his
remarkable ab11lty to exploit the semant10s of the Cold War •
In regard to

"

t

I

;

lIappeasemen~-fn

.

tor lnstanoe, he never tlred ot

us1ng what had to be the best one-11ner on the entlre sub
Jeot, one that he was to

e~ploy

on numerous occaslons:

•
I

vast maJorlty ot them [Aslans) are oonv1nced, I belleve,

J

~hat

it
1

!

"A

the road to appeasement 1s not the road to peace and

that appeasement, as at Mun1ch, 1s but surrender on the
lnstallment plan. 1t19 Thus ln one tell swoop he managed to
rattle an already frightened Amer1can,pub110 by conJurlng up
b1tter memories ot H1tler, Chamberlaln, World War II, and

t

installment buylng--a memorable teat eventtor a polltlcian.

!

On another ocoaslon he lnslsted that whlle Aslans stlll

!
I

admired what the United States represented, suCh good will
lau. s., Consress1onal Record, S2d Conga, 1st Sess.,
1951, XCVII, Part 1,,157.
19Wil11am F. Knowland, IIA Fatetul Hour: Necesslty tor
Combatlng Aggresslve Oommun1sm in As1a," Vltal BEeeohes,
Deoember 15, 1950, p. 155
I

·s ' '

J
! '

I,
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oould be inoreased it only America would udraw the line'
aga1nst Oommun1sm. 20

IIDraw1ng the line" had beoome an

the Knowland lexicon.
1mportant and catohy phrase in
>
1dea seemed to be that

tr1o~

The

toreign policy disputes oould

be settled by line-drawing, muon as a schoolboy m1ght etch
out a line with h1s toe 1n the dust ot a playground and dare
the looal bully to step across it.

However quest10nable the

va11d1ty of such an analogy may have been, Xnowland sensed
the American pub110 aooepted it, and that was all that
I

I
I
I

mattered.
In his speech to the Senate ot Deoember 4, he outlined
~

I

policy that it 1mplemented would presumably have held the

11ne against Commun1sm in As1a.

F1rst, as the result ot a

reoent junket to Xorea, he urged that Ame%! oan airorart be
allowed to pursue Chinese f1ghters aoross the Yalu R1ver and

\

Xnowland Was yet another ot the air and

t

naval strategists tpat the Amerioan R1ght produced in no

i

short supply dur1ng this period.

i•
I

into Manchur1a.

argued that it only

i
!

Ii
I

"II

I

As a oonsequenoe, they

~he

"ott limits· s1gns were removed,
Amerioan air power would end the war 1n Xorea. 21

Xnowland next turned h1s attention to Japan and called
tor "an early Japanese peaoe treaty, ,w1th Japan hav1ng means.
under proper supervis1on, ot part10ipating in the oolleot1ve
seour1ty system aga1nst aggress1on ••' • ,. ,22 Most

1
20u. S.,Con~essional Reoord,.p. 15S.

21Xnowland, p. 156.

22Ib1d.

j

I

I

I

23

1:

conservat1ves wholeheartedly concurred on this

poin~,

r ,

sens

ing, perhaps betore most liberals, that Japan would consti
tute an important anchor in any defensive screen in East
(Otten, however, the impo~tanoe ot this view Was lost

Asia.

amidst the metaphorioal oliohes ot a cold War opportunist a8
when Senator Joseph McOarthy prophes1ed:

HIt Japan tal18,

the entire Paoific talls, and we w111 have a Red Pacltic
washlng
our western shores With lts communlstio athelstio
,
eroslon. II ) 23
I

i

II
f

(

!

t!
(

Knowland then turned to hls favor1te topio:

eoonomio

and ml1ltary aid to Chlang Kal-shek l s reglme on Formosa.
~lB1med

He

Chlang ' s armed forcss were over slx hundred thousand

men strong, a torce larger "than all

th~

other non-Communlst

nat10ns ot Asla put together. n24 Such a torce was slmply
lndispensable to the free world.

It would aot as a powertul

deterrent against any tuture Oh1nese Communist aggress1on.

II

i

•t

Moreover, l t supplled W1ththe proper equlpment the Republlc

i!

ot Chlna would be able to st1mulat a 1t s IJnon-Oommuni at,

I

guerrl11a forces ot over 1,000,000 menu which were operating

t

Ii
I

behlnd the iron curtaln. 25 Furthe~, Chlnese Natlonal1st

,I

torces'(llou1d be able to oonduot "ralds tl along the coast ot
Chlna which would have the etfeot of forclng the Commun1sts
to slphon troops away trom

I

M~nohuria

rellevlng the beleaguered Unit ad

I

and Koraa, thereby

~atlons

I

forces t1ghtlng on

23u• S., Congre!!,!onal R!!£2rd, Part 2, p. 2396.
2~bld.

'I
1/

,

25~.

)1
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the peninsula.
Another aspect ot Knowland1s drawing-the-line plan
oonsisted ot giving lithe Chinese Communists 4g hours to stop
their aggress10n in Korea and to get baak across the Yalu
River.".

It they retused Knowland would have had the Unlted

States ask all member states ot the Un1ted Nations to
·pledge H to withdraw any recognition that had been afforded
that reglme.

Such action. Xnowland maintained J would

uweaken the prestige ot Mao tse-tung at home and (wOUld]
'make that government l~legal ln, the eyes ot the people.ft26
!

1
1

1
I

,Wh1le he dld not

speo1f1c~ly

say so, it seems apparent that

/

Knowland telt suoh aot1on would have amounted to a diplo
matl0 oatastrophe ot such a magnitude that the Communist
government would have toppled trom sheer despair.
Flnally,

~

Kno~land

advooated Ian lmmediate naval blook

;

I

I

a~e

I

{

I

the entry or exit of a vessel ot any natlonality.l2f

f.

~

I

f

of the entire Oh1na coast ••• "-whloh would "not permit

.

I
I

,f

Strangely, muoh of the Senatorls thlnklng--and this
was true of many other oonservatlves as well--seemed to
refleot a fantast10 ignoranoe and/or deliberate mlsreading

ot what had been oocurrlng in China for the prevlous twenty

I

t

11

. ,I
~

years,.

The :fanatioal fal th he held 1n Chiang and. his Kuo

mlntang,1s almost myst1fying.

The only explanation that can

aooount for \such devotion was that Knowland could not bring
h1mself to accept the failure ot,the Nationalists.
26Ibid •

In going
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1

to almost any length to buttress

t~e

Ch1ang reg1me, he was

t

reduced to advooating a policy whose incept10n

1

proven fatal not only to Ohlang but quiteposslbly to the

,t

1

Un1ted States ltself.

woul~

have

Thls, at least, was the way ,the

Truman Adm1nlstration v1ewed proposals or th1s sort.

There

lsabaolutely no ev1dence to lndloate, tor example, that a
series of "ralds" along the

coa~t

ot 'Ohina would have had

any marked etfect on the Korean confllot.

The claim that

there were one mil110n dedloated guerrlllas operatlng on the
Mainland was probably pure tabrloat1on,?g but lt was impor
,tent because by

l~s

very

_~uggestlon

a

romantl~

lmage ot a

oourageous but vastly outnumbered group ot treedom t1 ghters
was 1nstllled in the m1nd of the publio.

The notion that

Mao would have withdrawn trom Korea as ,the result ot a
torty-eight hour ultlmatum, lest he lose "prestlge," was
ludicrous.' Again, it lndloated that Knowland had riot the
vaguest ldea ot,what Mao and bis revolutlon were all about.
And the proposal that a blockade ot China I s coast wlth the
rlght to turn baok vessels 'at "any- nat1onallty" amounted to
a declaration of war against Chlna anQ qu1te posslbly
aga1nst any other natlon whlch mlght choose to challenge
such a ukase. 'Clearly, in Deoember or 1950 the Unlted
States dld not lntend to prooeed along suan a path.
2SWhen querled about this"statistl0 by the author,
Senator Knowland chose not t'o reply.

26
Wh~le Knowlandrs J1ngo1sm was sucoessful 1n ga1n1ng

h1m further publ101ty and 1n extend1ng -the attaok on the
Admin1strat1on, 1t also had the ettect ot myst1fy1ng some ot
h1D oonAtorlAl

oollnA~\~Q.

To

aom~,

no mAttAr how

th~ npn~

ator sought to disgu1se oertain unpleasant eventua11t1es,
his remarks seemed to otter the very real possib111ty ot an
all-out war w1th Oommun1st Oh1na.

Such think1ng naturally

led them to wonder 1t th1s would mean a land war-on the
/

As1an oont1nent.

As a result of such disqu1et1ng thoughts,

Knowland hastened to a,ssure h1s tellow senators that noth1ng
oould have been turther trom h1s own mind:
I have never tavored sending a Un1ted Nat10ns land
army 1nto Manchur1a o~ 1nto China. I have never
. tavored sending an Amerloan ~my 1nto Manchur1a or
lnto Oh1na. I th1nk that would be a tut1le polley.
It would be the same m1stake that Napoleon made 1n
Russ1a, and that others have made in the lnvas10n
ot Russla. I would not operate 1n an area ot ter
ra1n 1n whloh the enemy ls super10r to us by 10 to
1. I would ,operate 1n areas where we!Are2~uperlor
to them by many times that number to one. ';J
,
;

,

t

I

t
I.

The quest10n remalned, however, Just prec1sely what were
those areas where the Un1ted States was "superior to them by
many t1mes that number to oneil?
slmple:

'1n sea and air power.

To Knowland the anawer was
Amerlcan sea and all' power,

ooupled w1th \Ohlang 1 s Amer1can-equlpped armles, would be
capable ot dea11ng the Commun1sts
would never recover.
1maglne, g1ven the

29u.

a

blow trom which they

Stll1, Skeptlos tound 1t dlfflcult to

~stOr.1

ot Chlang's m111tary record ln

S., Q£a~ess10nal Record, p. 162.
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il

I

':,:1

t

China, that Nationalist armies' could ever wrestle back con-

1

trol of the Mainland, even with the added faotor ot Amer10an

I

sea and a1r power~

~

, I

Knowlan~'s oontention was eventually to
"

beoome one or the weakest weapons 1n the arsenal ot the
R1ght. '

I
:!

I'.

:1

As mentioned above, becau·se ot h1s fasoination w1th

As1a Knowland tound little time to devote to Europe.

Even

during the height ot the debate he could only bring h1mself
to propose hslt-heartedly that Amerioa allocate one d1v1sion
tor European duty 'tor every six d1visions tielded by the

"I

Europeans themselves. 30 __ The proposal'go't nowhere, and
,Knowland seemed, not t'o oare, a refleotion, no doubt, ot his

, II
,

,

I:

general lack ot interest in the ent1re European issue.

It

the subjeot ot Europe did oooasionally str1ke a spark of
1nterest 1n him, it Was over a related matter rather than
Europe itself.

In

m~ng

h1s proposal on a ratio ot Ameri-

oan divis10ns for NATO, for example, he saw the 1mportanoe
of Europe linked, of' all places, to Afrioa:

"Oertainly it

1s vital that Europe not tall 1nto the orbit ot 1nternational oommun1sm.

It, Europe 1:8 lost to the tree world,

the strateg1c bases, and materials of Atrioa would be d1ffioult to hold.

The bulk of the uranium tor the American
atomio development oomes trom Africa."3l It is ot interest
to note that wh1le t.he Senator found the uranium ore ot
I .

Afr10a to be

9.~

pr1me importance to the.Un1ted States, he

I,

28
could n,ot b:rlng. that same th1nk1n.g to bear 1n regard to the

coal. iron ~:reJ and industrial capabi11ty of Western Europe.
Western Europe was important because it :represented a step
pingstone to Africa, not because of any worth ot its own.
Becau.se of this factor XnoWland felt Europe would have to be
defended, but hopefully not with American ground pe:rsonnel
in large numbe:rs.

Exactly how Europe should be detended

Xnowland did not spell out.

Apparently satisfied that he

had done his duty in explaining how the tide ot Oommun1sm
could be reversed in the F8l' East, he lett this oho:rs to his
close friend, Robe:rt A.___Tatt •.
Robert A. Tatt:

"Mr.

Herbert Hoover had beoome the

Amer1ca~

eld~r

statesman ot the

new isolationist movement, William Knowland had beoome its
As1an authority, but the maestro or the ent1re eftort was
Republican Senator Robert A. Tatt

o~

Ohio.

By 1950 Tatt had

arrived at an extremely important post for a Repub11can in
the Senate:

he was chairman of the Senate

~epubl1can

Po11cy

Oommittee, having risen to th1s position through the ranks
ot the Republican Party w$h remarkable sw1ttness.

What ever

the attributes are that propel a man up the ladder ot Amer1
can polit.ical su.ooess, Tatt seemed to possess them.

During

the 194o ' s he beoame established as ~ Republican voice 1n
,the Senate on domest10 attaira. Atter World War II he also
sougot to become an expert on toreign affairs. .He gradually

I

J

·

1

sllpped 1nto thls role and assumed lt completely w1th the
death ot Arth,ur Vandenburg ln 1950.

It was not long betore

he somenow began to personlfy what proper oonservatlve
th1nklng ougot to be all about, and beoause ot thls abll1ty
he was nlcknamed HMr. Republloan.·

One histor1an has sug

gested, however, that by the time ot the great debate he had
become uMr. Amerlca, If so

we+ l

dld he express

II

the publlc I s

amblvalent lsolatlon1st-aggresslve state ot emotlon" on
world atfa1rs.)2 An exam1nat~on lnto Tattls ph1losophles
does muoh to oonflrm the approprlateness ot the uMr. Amer
10a" eplthet, and lt also alds ln explainlng how the Senat~
beoame the acknowledged leader of the "new ls01atlonlsts. 1
Flrst and fundamentally, Taft had always been a

vlgor~

ous and slncere antl-00mmunlst.

He could toresee no worse

evl1.

ca~eer

Throughout hls senatorlal

lnternally and externally.

he tougot Oommunlsm

And as otten 8eems to be the

oase wlth oonservatives, Tart reoognized the danger ot Com
munlsm but Was apparently lnoapable ot seelng any threat
which mlght ohallenge the Republl0 trom the other end ot the

politloal speotrum.

William S. White, a generally fr1endly

b10grapher ot Tart t s, has revealed:

,
;/

In the war years and later h~ r1diouled any 'theory
that Nazl Germany had ever raised any danger to the
United states. He sald to me as late as November ot
1951 that at no time had Germany menaoed the securlty
ot the Unlted States and that there would have besn
32John w. Spanler, The Truman-MacArthur Controversl
and the Korean War (Oambr1dge: Belknap Fress, 1959), p. 156.

I
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no menace even had the Brltlsh fallen.

H1s passlonate denouncements at Communlsm were dl
pr1mar~11

t

reoted

I

the prlme mover ot all Oommunist activlty

I

30

"Soviet Rus~la,n

agalnst the Sovlet Unlon whlch he saw as

as

everywher~.

Tart preferred to call lt, had broken

every treaty to whlch lt had ever been a slgnatory.

It had

promoted the'ml1ltar1 aotlons of both North Korea and Ch1na.
There 11a8 '''sufflolent evldence, II he warned ln a speech on
the

, t

I
I

t

I,

5en~te

\

floor, "of' a determined plan to oommunlze the

entlre world, wh1ch oan be olearly envlsloned from the wrlt
lngs 01' Lenln and

8tallij~

just as Hltler's lntentlon oould

be round ln ~ein KSllll~f."34 In the Senator's mlnd, proof of'
the exlstenoe ot such a "plano could be tound by taklng note
of how far the oonsplracy had progressed wi thin the Unlted
States lt selt.

He inslsted various, organlzations and labor

unlons were belng 1nr11trated, as was "the government it
selt .1135 He had no apparent dlfflculty ln relatlng the
maoh1natlons of Sov1et imperla11sm wlth domestlc 1ssues
lnslde the United States and even, by lmpllcatlon, With an
Amerlcan government oontrolled by a party of whlch he was
not a member.

Sly allegatlons ot this sort always boosted

hls stook With tellow Republloans but over a perlod of tlme
oaused moderates to wonder about the credlblllty or his

, II

I
f

I

I

1

33W1l11am S. White, The Tatt Storl (New York:

& Brothers, 1954), p. 151.
340 .. 8., Oongresslonal Reoord, p. 56.
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arguments 1n matters dealing With foreign affa1rs.

It grad-

ually became evident that hi.s own style may have been one

the oh1ef obstacles in his legislat1ve

ot

dereats~

W1th Tattls concern over the oonSpiratorial power ot
J

the Sov1et Un10n being what it was, 1 t would. seem probable
that he would have been 1n the forefront of the tight to

fnorease the strength of NATO foroes in We~tem Europe.

strangely, suCh

w~s

not the oase.

He

aot1~ely

But,

opposed

Amerioan part1oipation in any European defense program
except under oertain speoified conditions.
his opposition was

man1~_old"-and

The bas1s for

often oddly contrad1otory,

at least when oompared With his ideas on the defense problems

ot the Far East.
Although the Soviets may have been engaging in var10us

sin1ster actiVities, Taft s1noerely felt that

th~y

were not

1nterested in launching any massive invas10n 1nto Western
Europe.

In fact, he felt American reaction to

ity of suoh an attack

m1g~t

t~e

possib1l-

well cause the Sov1ets to 1n1--

t1ate 1t out ot selt-detense:
The oourse we are pursuing Will make War more
likely. It this great international force whioh

we env1sion 1s gradually built up, the Rues1ans

tor a while Will gradu~lly increase the1r strength,
'but 1t seems obvious that it they think the Al11es
are g~1n1ng on them too rap1dly', they can always
begin the war. However defensive and pac1fic our
intentions, to them the building up o~ this torQg
must lO'ok like aggression when 1t 1s completed.'
Tart went' o~ to note that he had been unable to d1scover any

;6Ibld., p. 60.

I
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evidence which indicated the Soviets were p~eparlng to
lnvade Western Europe.
they waltlng?

Further, he wondered, tor what were

Surely lt made better sense tor them to

strike when ,western defenslve pos1t1ons were weak rather
than walt
tor the. completion
.
up.

All of thls

wa~

01'

an Amerlcan and allled bulld

reason enough, he clalmed, to be

against any inoreased Amerlcan role ln NATO, just as he bad
been opposed to the very formatlon of the Atlantl0 Paot in
1945.

Apparently acoepting any support he oould find tor

hls argument ,he was not above polntlng out the Atlant 10
Alliance "abandoned the whole prlnclple of the United
Nations,"37\Wh1ah was a rather ourlous statement ,for Tart
slnce he had shown little lnclinatlon to defend U. N.
prlnclpl$s in the 'past.
Often, however, it dld appear Tart was unsure of h1s
own.posit10n.

From time to time he noted, albe1t hesl

tantly, that lf Western Europe fell to the Sovlets the
threat to Amer1can liberty would be oonslderable.

Stl1l, he

oautloned, it dld not follow Jlthat beoause we des1re the
freedom of every oountry ln the world we must send an
Amerloan land army to that country' to defend it." 3g After
all, Europe had more than a sufflo1ent manpower base

fro~

whloh to raise an adequate army to repel any Sov1et attaok.

erll
,I
I,

37Robert A. Taft, IIgnlted States Relat10ns With West
Europe," V1tal SEeeohes, Jum 15,1951, p. 51g.
3gu. S., Oongresslonal Reoord, p. 1120.

Q$

*au;

C¢.=

Q

d$1 $ #$

•

America need only supply the armament.

33
No Amerioan divisions

would be necessary. ·It the situation became really desper
ate ~ however t he Was wil11ng to employ Amerioan air and sea
unlts.
Taft seemed to base at least part of his milltary
th1nking on his own reading of the outoome ot World War II.
In hls mlnd two

sim~le

lessons had emerged trom the War.

First, the Russlans had created a tremendous land army that
Was almost unstoppable; and

sec~nd,

the Amerioans had put

together an alr force which proved to be, ln hls own words,
lithe declslve factor ln the 'Winnlng of the war."39

Given

these two axioms, Taft consldered lt merely common sense to
mlnlmlze the role of American ground forces and to maximlze
Amerlc~

alr power.

Further, since the U. S. Navy was v1c-"

torlous ln the Pacltlc, its role ln any coming detensive
strategy would also have to be emphaslzed.
In short, 1n a Milltary sense Taft nurtured a. strategy
that suggested a phllosophical cross between Alfred T;. Mahan
and Curt1s LeMay.

That suCh a oomblnatlon would be etfeo

tlve was never doubted by the Senator:
.My own Vlei<1 ls that we do have the capaclty to
seoure a practlcal control .of sea and alr, through
out the world. I believe we do have the capaclty
to bul1d up an alr force so superlor to Russla as
to gl ve us control ot the alr over thls country,
over the oceans that" surround thls continent and
everywhere, except perhaps over Russia itself. I
believe that should be the first prlority, and I
have not heard any substantlal objection made

39Ibld., p. 57.
I

aga1nst this priority. In theory the adm1n1strat1on
a grees.40 In pract1ce they seem to prefer land
arm1es.
What accounted for Tattls 1nfatuat1on With a1r and
naval. power'

Poss1bly the best an'swer is supplied by

White:
He told me 1n 1951, 1n the per10d when he was
f1rst clamor1ng for a reassessment of fore1gn-m111ta~
polley to g1ve pract1cally all the emphasls to sea
alr, that h1s .proposal had been 1nfluenoed, it not
shaped, by' "oerta1n read1ng" he had been d01ng. "What
read1ng, Senator," he was asked. "I have gone very
carefully aga1n over the h1story of the Napoleon1c
campa1gn, II he replled. "Wel11ngton at Waterloo
acoomp11shed what he ~ld w1th only twenty per cent
of h1s troops trom th. Un1ted Kingdom and the rest
mercenar1es."
I
He had, 1n short, bf a strange paradox" a com
pulslve blas toward the most trad1tlonally profes
sional of all profess10nal ml1itary op1nion. He
bel1eved that what Br1taln had done ln the
e1ghteenth oentury by her control of the sea the
.Un1ted States and Br1ta1n. w1th Br1ta1n of oourse
the lesser partner i could do past the halfway mark
1n the twent1eth century.
In thls regard he saw a1r power as only an exten
s10n ot the' sea arm. And because of hls hes1tat1ons,
because of his l1vely but uncomprehending compass10n
tor the nasty job of the 1nfantry, he gladly ac
oepted one of the speclal prejud10es of the ol~~
taSh10ned Admirals--the1r preJud1ce agalnst a war
ot mass and espeolally aga1nst hav1ng to use vast
'numbers ot amateurs 1n the shape of qu10kly lm
pressed c1vll1ans. Taft could readily understand
th1s; he d1d,not 11ke amateurs 1n po11tl~al '
c~mpa1gns .11-1
As wlth Hoover, Tatt also tearea the posslble eoonom1c
repercusslons .of a thlrd world,war.

War would have meant

4o Tatt , "Un1ted States Relatlons w1th Western Europe,·

p.

511.

41Wh1te,·p.154.
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probable rederal controls on the rree enterprise system, a
disaster in Tattls opinion.

White quotes him as saying

that any future war might torce lithe nationalization of all
industry and all capi~al and ~ll labor" whioh could onlr
mean an eventual " socialist diotatorship. n42

Even the

/

preparation ror War "was likely to be almost 8s':Jbad as war
itselt. u43 (Taft's .anxiety in this area was Shared by h1s
colleague, Kenneth Wherry, Who in addressing the Senate
onoe wondered rhetorically, "How long ••• do you suppose
America can, escape becoming a garrison state when annual
expenditures are running at the rate ot a hundred billion
dollars'") 44

Su~h a Vi;;

may sound strange in the light ot

hiD dedicat10n to a strong air and naval torce, but Taft
actually felt that air and naval readiness would not be
nearly as eXpensive as the maintenance of hundreds ot
1nt~try divisions. 45
T~tt

Truman's

also

de~ire

ins1ste~

that much at h1s opposition to

to increase Amerioan ground forces was based

on the manner in which the inorease was to be oarried out.
Re ttalt ,that Truman had to seoure the approval ot Congress
before prooeeding W1th any increase; to do ot~erw1Be would
be tantamount to subverting the Constitution.

42~., p. 150.

Taft referred

43lliSi., p. 153.

440. S., Con~essiona!-~~~, p. 32g.
45Wh1te, p. 153. In 1950-51 this may well have been
the oase, although it is almost imposs1ble to arrive at any
oost c;somparison.

to this upon oooaslon as the IIfundamental lssue" 1n the
great debate and attacked execut1ve agreements 1n fore1gn
polloy beoause they threatened the llbertles of the Amer1can '
people. 46 Whether 1t really was the "fundamental lssue" ls
J

open to aer1ouaquestlon; what mattered, however, was that
•

tact10ally Tart was able to hurt the Adm1nlstrat10n moro
wlth th1s one Charge than wlth other weapon in hls armory_
'The ldea ot presldential usurpat10n of congressional power
dld not sit well With his tellow senators, and Tart knew it.
Even tormer Secretary ot State James Byrnes was forced to
agree, argulng, nIr

~e

are to have a bl-partlsan polley, the

President should consult the leaders ot the mlnorlty • • •
party betore and not atter baslc deois10ns ot po11cy are
made.

Once deo1s10ns are 'made, consultatlon is a sham.- 47
Flnally, tor all hls worr,ylng about Amerlca becom1ng

overextended in Europe, Tatt was shoulder to shoulder with
Knowland on IIhold1ng the l1ne ll ln As1a.

He became part at

what White has aptlY oalled "the polltloo-m1l1tary cult that
.

developed around General MaoArthur. a

If.g

As1de trom bestow1ng

hosannas on MacArthur and h1s policies, the oult encouraged
"I,

a strong sense of American

nat1o~11sm,

qUest10ned the

patr10tism and motives of oertain Admin1stration offiolals,
4,6U• S., Q,£ngref!sional Re£g£,~, P'. 61.
47James F. Byrnes, flF1rm Stand by a Un1ted People May
Prevent War," V1tal Speeches, February 15, 1951, p .. 269.
4-gWh1 t e , p.

16,7.
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and, ae has been shown, denied the notion of European
defense being related to Amer1can seourity.
maintains,

•

Tart, White

was riot wholly oomfortable 1n the cult
aspect ot the thing. n49 Perpaps not, but somehow he man
n' • • •

aged to h1de his discomtort.

--~-

"'J

49 Ibid .,. p.
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CHAPTER III

•

THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE

Muoh of the Adm1n1strat10n's fear of the poss1b1lity
the Sov1ets would attack Western Europe was generated by the
~enera~

Oold War atmosphere Wh1ch grew not1oeably more

fr1g1d after 194a.

Most author1t1es have f1xed tl'lO events

1n part1oular--the detonat10n ot the f1rst SoViet atom1c
bomb late 1n 1949 and the Oommun1st attack on South Korea
1n June of 1950--a8 the prime causes of th1s apprehens10n.
Indeed, after the open1ng of the Korean War h1gh off1c1als,
both 1n Wash1ngton and 1n the

caplt~ls,ot

Western Europe

"seemed to be agreed that the Sov1ets'had sh1fted baok from
po11t1cal means for ach1ev1ng the1r amb1t10ns to m111tary
ones." l The 1mpetus for'proViding additional Amer1can
troops to NATO would therefore seem to date from th1s per10d.
Aotually, however, Admin1strat10n aot10n 1n this
regard "began apprOximately s1x months ear11er.

30, 1950 th

p

~~a1dent

On January

author1zed the Nat10nal Seour1ty

Oouno1l to begin work on a seoret study (NSO-6g) wh1ch would
analyze the objeot1ves ot the Dn1,ted States 1n peaoe and war
dur1ng the oom1ng years.

.

The study was oompleted 1n the
,

II
I

'

'"1
II

laoger H11eman, "NATO: The Developing Strategi.c Oon
text,Q NATO and Ame~1can Secur1tl; ed. K1uss Knorr (Pr1nce
ton: Prinoeton UnlverS!ty Prees; 1959), p. 19.
/

II

~
,I
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spr1ng ot the same year and was to prove to be a m1lestone
or sorts 1n the shap1ng of Amer10an fore1gn pol1cy.

Wh1le

'it has not yet been declassified, the general reoommenda
tion of NSO-6g are fairly well known.

It oonoluded that

Soviet policy oonsisted ot three major objectives Which have
been summarized as:
(1) to preserve and to~strengthen its pos1tion as
the ideological and power center 01' the Communist
l1orld;( 2) to extend and to consol1date that power
by acquis1t10n 01' new satellites; and (3) to oppose
and to weaken any oompeting system if power that
~hreatens Oommunist world hegemony.
In light

01'

these oonolusions, it seemed sate to predict

that Soviet military strength would oontinue to increase
over that

01'

the West until "the eoonom1c rehab111tation ot

. Western Europe and the full implementat10n

01'

the NATO al11

anoel. were oarr1ed out. 3
The forecasts related 1n NSO-6s were not unanimously
acoepted by all
l

b~anohes

01'

the

Admin1~trat10n,

State Department offi01als were Sharply

div1~ed

however.
over it.

The so-oalled "Krem11nologists" at State argued Mosoow had
no real desire'to assume the role of an.expans10n1st m111
tary power bent on world dom1nat10n.

Members of the Plan

ning 'Statt,. inolud1ng Dean Aoheson himselt, argued that
while th1s was tine in theory, it must not detraot trom the
2Cabell Ph1ll1ps, The Truman Pres1dencl (New York:
The Macm1l1an Company, 1966J, p. 306, 01t1ng Paul Y. Ham
mond, Nso-6S: pr()lO~e to Rearmament (New York: Columb1a
Un1versitrPr~ss, 3:-9 }, no p •.. no. g1ven.
3J:'bid.» p.307.

1 lli.d.

f

n

fact that the Soviets would oontinue to probe tor "weak
spots". in the West and, onoe having found suoh trailties,
would demand oonoesslons. 4 It was neoessary, theretore, to
el1minate the vulnerab1l1ty of suen areas by inoreasing the
strength ot military allianoe systems suah as NATO.

Natu

rally, the v1ew of the Aoheson team prevailed.
Still, how valid were
NSC-6g?

th~

views and reoommendations ot

Senator Taft, who knew nothing about the study,
I

would surely have rejected it out of hand as a ·clumsy
attempt to bolster ,the sagging NATO allianoe.

Moreover,

trom the evidenpe so far aVailable it would seem probable

--

that even those who were the most impressed with it were not
totally assured of its validity.
possibly the

bes~

Under the oircumstanoes

defense of the report was penned by Dean

Acheson almost twenty years later:
A decade and a half later a school of academio
critic~sm has concluded that we overreacted to
Stalin, which in turn caused him to overreact to
polioies of the United States'. This may be true.
FortunatelY1 perhaps, these authors were not oalled
upon to an~yze a situation in whioh the United
~tates had not taken the aotion whioh it did take. 5
~at ever

the validity of th,e premises or the report,

onoe they were
aooepted they had to be sold to the Congress
\
and the ·pub110.

.

This was preoisely what Aoheson did in the

late spring and early summer ot 1950.

Unfortunately, as he

4nean AOheson, ~resent at the Creation (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 753 • .

-

5Ibid.

~
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was later to adm1t, an "over-sell" was deemed neoessary;
consequentiy tbe nature of the Sov1et menace tell ~lctlm to
hyperbole.

Again, Aoheson hlmself explained 1t best:

Qua11f1oat10n must g1ve way to s1mp11oity ot state
ment, nlcety and nuanoe to bluntness, almost brutal
1ty, 1n carrying home a polnt. It 1s better to oarry
the heare~or reader into the ~adrant ot one's
thought ~han merely to make a noise or to mlslead hlm
utterly.
And, so it came to pass th~t, in the Seoretary's words, Hit
we made our po1nts clearer than truth, we did not dltfer
trom most other eduoators and oould hardly do otherwlse. D7
As an "educator P Acheson would prove to
I

b~

no small success, 

even though some ot his-students turned out to be 1ncor
r1g1ble.
W1th the acoeptanoe ot Nso-6S 1n Adm1n1stratlon Circles
and w1th Aoheson's "over-sell" oampalgn under way by late

sprlng, obv1ously much of Wash1ngton's anx1ety

to~ard

Sovlet

1ntent1ons 1n Europe had orystal11zed betore the start ot
the Korean War.

The' decision to augment NATO was olearly

related d'1reotly to the tlndlnlis ot NSO-6S.

'filen the war

1n Korea 19n1ted, 1t served only to re1nforoe a tundamental
be11et already held by key Adm1n1strat10n personnel:

the

torces or internatlonal Commun1sm, d1reoted by the Kremlin,
were on the march.
6~., p. 375. '

-

7Ibid.
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The Detense 01' Eur0E!
The Administration held a series 'ot high level meet
ings during the summer months to
the detense of Europe would take.

t~rash

out the exaot nature

Prodded by the Pentagon,

Aoheson and his advlsers reaohed the oonolusion that German
participatlon would be neoessary it a suocessful detense ot
Europe were tf be guaranteed.

.

~o~~nced

Seoretary

On the last

ot 'July the

d~y

the Presldent 01' this vlew.

lem, however,1 now beoame doubly diff1cult:

g

The prob

not only would

the American jPublio have to be'conVinced that increased par- 

t'ic~pat1on

1J NATO was 'necessary, but it would also have to

t~ot

aocept the

the alllance.
I

I

tion of

cour~e

.

'

This latter issue would also prove to be a

~th

sore point

that a tormer hated toe would be needed ln
the other alliance members. ,The Admlnlstra

realized th1s, but the tear ot a Sov1et inva

. f

sion was so strong that German lnvolvement was consldered
~ccording

essentlal.

to Aoheson:

·At the time • • • the

danger to Eu~ope seemed to us great and immediate" and thes~
dec1sions

we~e
I

not belng made 1n the unhurried oalm ot an

aoademic study.19
These tssues and others were brought to the attent10n
of the other alliance

mem~ers

during a series at meet1ngs

r

held in New iork beglnning on September 15unscp.eduled

~ub110

I
g

I

To avoid any

disclosure during these meetings,
'

.~+ p. 437.

9~., p.

440.

President Truman on September

9 first publicly announced

America's intent to increase its torges stationed in Western
Europe.

l(hile not disolosing exaot figures, the President

let it be known that the number of additional troops needed
would be "worked out in olose ooordination II With other NATO
t'

members.
Oonservative Opposition to the announcement and the
NATO meeting was largely blunted by the success ot the
Inchon invasion in ,Korea.

With the recapture of SeOUl and

the almost total annihilation of'the North Korean armies,
protestations 1n
trom sight.

~egard

t?-European polioy momentarily Bank

In fact, senatorial support tor Truman's pro

posed troop increase seemed to mount, at least among,Admin
istration supporters.

Senator Tom Connally, ohairman ot

the important Foreign Relations Oommittee,remarked:
. Despi te the war in Korea and the tension thro~gh
out the Far East--let us never forget it--Europe is
st1ll the pivotal point. Continued weakness in
western Europe will free the Soviet Un10n for aggres
sive action everywhere. A strong Europe is a bar
rier,. not only to Soviet ambitions in the west, but
to the Kremlin's treedom of aotioDOin the Middle
East and in the Far East as well:. J.
.
During the

ne~t

two months the NATO question continued

to simmer on the back burner while the Korean s1tuation bub
bled and eventually bo11ed over.

Nevertheless, the defense

ot Europe and the question of Amerioan participation in that
lOU. S., Con~essional Reoord, Slst Cong., 2nd Sess.,
XCVI, Part 2, 15~52 •
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detense oould not be forgotten. , As Acheson later put it:
, The North Atlantio Treaty, its organization, and
its m1litary torces are recognition ot the truth that
no balanoe of power in Europe, or elsewhere, adequate
to restrain Soviet pow'er is poss1ble unless the
weight of the United States is put 1'nto the soales.
Without assooiation with the United States, the Euro~
pean powers cannot prevent the le'adera ot the Soviet
Union from having the1r way in Western Eu~ope. With
out Amerioan association With Western Europe,
indapendl.ent nat10nal lite in Eastern Europe oannot
rev1ve. 1
In order to pursue these ends, Aoheson tlaw to Brus
sels 1n the -middl a of December.

Once there he sought agree

ment tor the appointment ot an Amerioan as Supreme Commander
of an integrated NATO force.

Atter some disoussion the

oounoil deoided it IIwould appoint General E1senhower as
Supreme Commander ot the integrated force and each govern
ment would put under his oommand its troops ass1gned to the
1ntegrated torce. ul2 Most observers felt that given E1sen
hower's baokground in World War II, the decision was mili
tar1ly sound.

Lett unsa1d was the taot that since he was an

Amer1can, hi s appo1ntment would a1d in dampen1ng any conser
vative opposition to the NATO issue that m1ght develop
within the United- States.
Ironioally, however, while
maneuver1ng matters in

Br~ssels,

~he

Secretary was adroitly

Herbert Hoover was busy

delivering the open1ng oannonade of

th~ g~eat

debate.

llnean ACheson, Power ,and D1plomaol (Cambridge:
Harvard UniverSity Press, 1958), p. 84.
l2Acheson, Present at ~he Creation, p. 4S6.

I

.
1

-,

geturn1ng to Washington on December 21, Aoheson was aghast
when he heard abQut Hoover" s speeoh:

liThe stench of spirit

less defeat, of death ot high hopes and broad purposes,
given ott by these statements deeply shocked me.

It, took a
•

day of talk1ng with my assoclates tor the sltuatlon to sink
In. Ill;

Apparently the exact nature of the Hoover speeoh had

caught the whole Adm1n1stratlon otf guard.

On December 19,

only two days earller, Presldent Truman had indicated 11ttle
conoern over the strength of his domest10 opposltlon:
Q. Mr. President, in 11ne With what you have been
telllng us about forelgn polloy, a number of writers
believe that there is a--as they put It--a wave ot
1so1atlonlsm rlslng ln the Unlted States. Do you
teel that oonditlon to exlst?
THE PRESIDENT. I donlt thlnk there 1s any Wave ot
'ls01atlon1sm,. put Side of the Ch1oago Tr.,1bune anq
those papers.1Ll

Owlng to the reverberatlons ot the Hoover speeoh, the
Adm1n1strat10n began to have se~ond thoughts over the pos
slble 1nfluenoe ot the new lso1at1onlsts.

On December 22

Aoheson oalled h1s own news oonterenoe'and sharply rebutted
polnt by polnt Hoover's remarks.
Amerloan people to reJeot "any

He ended by oalllng on the

pol~oy

ot sltt1ng qulver1ng

ln a storm oellar waltlng for whatever fate others may w1an
13Ib1d ., p. 4S9.
14U. 5., Presldent, "The President's News Conferenoe
ot Deoember 19, 1950, II Pub11c Papers of 19.e. President s 2!
the Unlted States: Ha~rl S. Truman (Washlngton: Unlted
States Government Prlntlng Off~oe, 1965), p. 752.
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to prepare for us. n15 . As the news conference ooncluded, it
was clear to most onlookers the Adminlstration was now tully
oognizant or the danger pose~ to the nation's foreign po11cy

by the

Hoover~~a~t

segment of the Repub11a&n Party and wae
,

prepared to engage 1t in verbal battle.

Just three days

before, the President had stated he could see no nwave ot
isolation1sm" washing over the oountry.
.

Now Acheson had
.

asserted that neither. was the Administration g01ng to allow
one to swell up.
So matters rested tor the remain1ng two weeks ot the
old year as both oamps broke tor the .respite afforded by the
~.-"

holidays.

Yet 1t seemed a foregone conolusion that with the

com1ng ot the new year the great debate was go1ng to take up
a lot

or

everyone's time.
The Conservatives Attack

The atta'ok on the Adm1n1st;ratlon's:'forelgn polloy was
launohed anew in a lQng speech made by Robert Tart on the
rloor or the Senate on January 5, 1951, just three days
berore the Pres1dent was soheduled to deliver
State 'ot the Un10n address.
tor the1r scattergun etrect:
get that had

~s

annual

Tatt's remarks were noteworthy
they h1t Just about every tar-

ever outraged the Amer1can Right.

In some

respects they a'leo 'oonveyed a sense ot frustrat1on, of some
15Dean Acheson, "United Aotion tor the Defense or a
Free World, U The De12artment ot State Bulletin, January 1,

1951,

p.

6.
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desperate grandstand ~lay needed to gain the pub11c's atten
tion and win its support of foreign policy issues.
Beg1nning with-Korea, which in January or 1950 seemed
the epitome ot hopelessness, ~att lashed out at America's
role 1n the world.

Korea afforded Taft an exoellent example

With wh10h to attaok the Admin1strat10n because his own
views on the

Wal'

were always so ambiguous.

On the one hand

he demanded a po11cy that would insure "total viotory' over
Commun1sm 1n Asia.

Yet on the other he opposed the flneed

less slaughter ot AmerIcan boys," even 1f such opposit10n
meant the total evacuat10n of Amer1can troops trom the area.
Regardless ot,,;;what the A'dm1nlstrat1on did, then, the Korean

War became a oonvenient politioal whipsaw which Taft and h1s
tellow d1ss1dents used to bludgeon it.

On occasion, as 1n

his speech ot January 5, this s,trategy took some cur10us
tWists.

Tart proposed that the United States had been duped

by the Sov1ets 1nto getting 1nvol.ved in the war in the first
place.

Thie they had acoomplished by slyly inveigling the

,Adm1n1stration into initiating and helping to pass the
Un1ted Nations resolution whioh author1zed a military re
sponse to North Korea's aggress1on, a resolution the Soviets
could

~ot

veto because they ware boyootting the

Council
at the t1me.
,

~eourity

However, since the Chinese entered the

war it had become.imposs1ble to pass a s1m1lar resolution
aga1nst them because the Sov1ets were once again partici
pating,in the Security Counoil.

mo

Tatt the lesson WaS

4g
olear:

proper United Nations m1litary action aga1nst Ch1na

(the bomb1ng

01'

Chinese bases and supply lines, tor 1n

stanoe) could not be brought to bear because
ery.

The Soviets

at

ot this trick

first had purposely stayed away trom

the Seour1ty Counoil meet1ngs in order to "suckA the United
States into the war, and then they had reola1med the1r seat
1n order to insure the Chinese an opportunity to engage
America in an endless and apparently stalemated ground war.
Tatt could "only sadly surmise: . "We were sucked 1nto the
Korean War, as a representative ot the United Nations, by a
delusion as to a power whioh never has existed under the
Charter." 16 As to the future, he would not hes1tate a guess
but oftered the suggestion that it worst came to worst, it
would be Utar better to tall baok to s' defensible pos1tion
in Japan and Formosa than to maintain a Korean position
which would surely be 1ndefens1ble in any third world
war. ,17
Tatt's willingness to "tall back l• to Japan and Formosa
was aga1n 1nd1cative 01' his strong trust 1n air and sea
power.

Amerioan airoraft and naval vessels would be able to

defend, these 1s1ands trom any foe.

H1s reasoning tor so

thinking was otten grounded, a s his b10grapher Wil11am s.
\f.nite has already shown,. 1n quest10nable histor1cal

j,

16u • S., Congress1onal

XCVII, Part 1, 57.
17~., p.

,8.
/

Reo~~, g2d Cong., 1st Sess.,

\

analogles:
Our posltlon ls not greatly un11ke that ot Great
Br1taln, wh10h dom1nated muoh ot the world for a
perlod of 200 years, and brought about the balanoe
ot peaoe of the last halt of the n1neteenth century.
'The Brlt1sh had oontrol of the seas and met every
ohallenge to that oontrol. There Was no questlon
Of a1r power. They seldom oomm1tted any oonslder
able number ot Br1t1sh land troops to oontlnental
warfare, and When they did so they were by no means
suooesstul.
It Was the sea power of Br1ta1n wh10h gave Br1tain
a powertul 1nfluenoe on the Contlnen~ of Europe 1t
selt. It seems to me that by reasonable al11ance
w1th Br1taln, Franoe, Holland, Australia, and Canada
the oontrol or sea and air can estab11sh a power
whlch never can b.e challenged by Russ1a and wh1ch
can protect Europe as 1t has been proteoted now for.
5 years through tear ot whfi sea and a1r power can
aooomplish·against Russia.
Even w1th such a tirm beliet 1n the m1ght ot sea and
a1r power, Taft made 1t plain he still felt there was a need
tor a profess1onal army.

Us1ng the opportun1ty to switoh

from the Far East to Europe, he dld "not object to comm1t
t1ng some 11m1ted number ot Amer10an divis10ns" to Europe
provlded the Europeans themselves contributed a larger
amol:lnt to NATO detense.

He fUrther caut10ned that suoh a

program "never ought to be a key pO.1nt ln our overall m111
tary strategy. n1 9 St111 t whatever h1s 1ntent10ns, his
statement s1gnlfying that some Amer1can troops in Europe
would be permissible was to prove to be a source of diffi
culty to h1m 1n the oom1ng weeks.

The lmportanoe ot h1s

remark had not 'Peen lost on the Adm1n1strat10n.
,

.

19 Ibld •• p. 69.
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Tattls apparent unswerving taith in 'air power was
jolted m1dway through his speeoh when a senator triendly to
the Admin1stration's pos1t1on ohallenged some ot his assump
tions.

Senator Paul Douglas rose to inquire why, 1t a1r

power were such a panaoea, had it not turned the trick in
Korea where the United States enjoyed complete air dominance.
The Chinese were continuing to pusn baCk United Nations·
t'oroea, and Amer10an a1r power was seem1ngly 1noapable ot
stopp1ng them.

Tatt was trankly forced to admit, tor the

tirst time, that bombing alone ,was not gOing to stop an
army.

To Which Douglas asked:
I

Does it not tollow trom the Senator's statement that,
it continental Europe does not build up a suft1c1ent
army to oheck the Communists on the ground our threat
ot bomb1ng from the air w111 certainly not stop the
Oommunist armies it they w1sh to move into Europe'
MR. TAFT. Once war 1s deolared it will not stop
the Oommunist 81"11es, no.
MR. DOUGLAS. And will not the Commun1st armies
therefore sweep through comp2etely to the EngliSh
Channel?
MR. TAFT. Does the Senator think there would be
any d1fference 1f we have 10 American div1s10ns
there'?
MR. DOUGLAS. That is sanething else.
MR. TAFT. It 1s not someth1ng else aga1n. It is
exaotly the question the Senator 1s asking. I am
say1ng that the oommitment 01' Amerioan t~80ps will
not substantially change that s1tuation.
In this short encounter lay the rationale tor all the ver
biage' ot both camps conoerning the mer1ts ot air power.
I,

Unfortunately; three months were t'o pass betore most ot the

I

partio1pant~

tully rea11zed tb1s' tact.

20~., p.

62.
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The beliet in the invinoibility of air power was not
an easy one to dispel among certain Republicans.

The Repub

lican minority leader, Kenneth Wherry, held to the opinion
throughout the debate that air power was the "decisive"
weapon in World War II and theretore would be in World War
III also.

He conceded that 11' war ,came to Europe, the

United States would be unable to stop it, but the "Russian
horde" would soon beoome llpowerless n because Amer1can bomb
1ng would cr1pple Russian industry and agriculture at home.
Reasoned the Nebraskan:
, There is nothing un1que about trading space while
gett1ng off knook-out -punohes by air and sea. It is
not pleasant to oontemplate Europeans tak1ng another
occupation, temporary though 1t may be, but there
will be many more Europes lett, and more ot their
1ndustr1es st111 standing, 1n that oircumstanoe, than
it we wage ground war, w1th another inferno of guns
and tanks and bombs oonsuming Europe. It is a oase
01' the lesser of two ev11s.2~
In other wor~s, .not only would massive bomb1ng

01'

the Soviet

Un10n br1ng about the end of Red aggreSSion, 1t would also
save E?rope from the ph,s1oal destruot1on that would result
from the olashing ot large ground arm1es.

To engage Amer

10an troops 1n such an "infernal 1n Wherry1e v1ew would be a
"too11sh venture. a
Taft, wh1le agreeing w1th Wherry, wondered 11' the
1nferno oould not be' postp~ned altogether by not antagon1z
ing the Sov1ets 1n the f1rst place.

This could be qUite

s1mply acoomp11shed by ~ inor~asing the s1ze 01' NATO

52
forces.

Otherwise, asserted Taft, "the bUilding up of a

great army surrounding Russia from Norway to Turkey and Iran
might produce a fear of the invasion of Russia or some Of
the satellite oountries regard~d by Russia as essential to
the defense ot Moscow.u2~ Understandably, the Soviets saw
I

the Situation in largely the same light ~nd 1ndicated that
Tattle evaluation, at any tuture ground war was a correot
one.

The correlation between Tattle view and the Kremlin's

Was duly noted by the Administration, and during the middle
of the debate the State Department repr1nted--no doubt glee
tully--a Tass report Which observed:

:

'

~ven suoh an experienced reactionary as the Amer1
can Senator Taft was reoent~v forced to adm1t that
the plans which are be1ng hatched by the American
aggressors for a War with Russia on the European
Continent by land forces are doomed to failure and

f~~~s:rbt~V::i~~p~re~~~n~ ~t~~e~o~~cE;~;:d:~3be

Taking a somewhat d1fterent tack, other conservatives
argued that Europe must learn to stand alone. Senator
Willlam E. Jenner offered a sample :dlagnosls:
depend on

th~

Europe would

United States as a "crutch" as long as the

"crutch" remain'ed aval1able. A limplng Europe lacked the
"heart tt to.:.detend itselt. 24- Earller, Senator Edwin C.
Johnson· had reported to his colleagues that trom what he had
wltnessed

tlrs~

hand and had been able to plece together

22Robert A. Taft, A Forel~ Policy for Americans
(Garden Clty: Doubleday & Oompany:' Inc., 1951), p. li;.
1951,
I

I

,

XOVII,

23The Department or State BUlleti~~ .February 12,

p.~O.

240.

Pa~t

~

S.,congr~~sional Reoord, g2d Cong., 1st Sess.,
2, 2601.
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from others, the people of Western Europe d1d not th1nk war
\vas imminent and consequently were livery calm and complacent
about the whole thing. II

This

,\-18.8

sO despite the tact that

France and Italy were "teeming w1th comrnun1sm.1I Furthermore,
1t hardly made good sense to send the Amer1can army to
countr1es such as Germany s1nce 1t was lithe most pacifist
country in the world. 1125
Pac1fist or not, tor some Adm1n1strat1on opponents
NATO would be lmpotent unless the participation of West Ger
many was insured.

Senator Joseph McCarthy went one step

further and asserted that it did not make any difference
whether the Un1t.ed States sent one or ten or twenty divi
s10ns to Europe; the entire region would be lOst "w1thout
.

.

the

~npower

of Spa1n and Western Germany." Any plan that

dld not 1nclude both of these countr1es would const1tute a
"'phony defense .1126
While most of the spotl1ght of publ1city was concen
trated on the senate dur1ng the great debate, the House
occas1onally d1d enter the fracas.
~ouse

mlnor+ty leader Joseph

M1d't-.ray through February,

~~rt1n

reluctantly conceded

the. t Amerlca.. should provide equlpment Iland pos slblj" some ot
the manpower II necessary for the defense of "[estern Europe.
Stl11, he emphas1zed that the Ilfocal point" of Amer1ca's
troubles was As1a, not' Europe.

}artin warned he would use

every resource at h1s command to counteract any Adm1n1stration
25Ibid., Part 1, p. 497.

26 Ibld., Part 2, p. 2397.

-
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strategy wh1ch 19nored ASia. 27 Two days later, llg of h1s
fellow Repub11cans went even further.

Offerlng somethlng

called. a "Declaration of Policy," the group demanded "that
the

Un1~ed

States concentrate its m1litary efforts on defend

1ng the Western Hem1sphereo and cease,supply1ng a1d of any
k1nd to Western Europe unless that area 1ndicated a w1ll1ng
ness to carry n1ts ful~ share of the burden. n2S Just pre
oisely what a ·'full share' of the burden II const1tuted re

A def1n1tion was hardly neces

malned oloaked in ambiguity.

sary, however, s1nce the actual purpose of

t~e

manifesto was

to drum up publicity and pressure for the Tatt poslt10n in
I

"-

11ght of the fact that Senate hearlngs on the
slated to commence

t~e

l~sue

were

follow1ng day.
Truman' s

ResE~

Whlle .Taft and his support,ers oontinued to attack
Amerloa's defens1ve posture, the
1nactive.

.

Admlni~tratlon

was far from

On January g, 1950 Pres1dent Truman delivered his

annual State of the Un10n address and left 11ttle doubt as
to Where the

Admi~1strat1on

to-Europe 1ssue.

stood 1n regard to the troops

P01ntlng out that NATO oonstltuted the

IJheart" of Amer1oa's defense, he declared that 1t was also
I'the basls for def'ense of the wno:+e free world. II

The al11

I

ancs oould not be abandoned, for it lt were, lt would mean
\

27The New York Tlmes, February 13, 1951, p. 24.
2~Ib1d.,

February 15, 1951, p. 1.
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the "los s ot the largest workshop 1n the world. • • • Stra
tegically, econom1cally, and morally the defense of Europe
1s part ot our

Olm

defense. 029

The speeoh was generally

applauded both at home and abroad.

The Br1t1sh seemed par

t1cularly 1mpressed and The T1mes commented ed1torially:
No democrat1c leader has set out so simply before
the ~uty whioh now falls upon eaoh and upon all. The
connexion between the United States and Europe is a
partnersh1p 1n self-help and self-defenoe. There i8
no question here of paymaster and pensioners or sat
el11tes. Each has to g1ve, for 1ts own peaoeful sur
v1val and progress, 1ts due share, aocord1ng to 1ts
resouroes, to the grand design ot suocessfully deter
r1ng attaok, tor the f1rst t1m'e 1n history, by the
prompt and suff101ent Show of peaoeful strength.
The safety of Amer10a and that of Europe, as the
Pres1dent sa1d~ are-one. The Pres1dent has set a
high standard • .lO
Dete~m1ned

not to be overshadowed by Truman's address,

ihe Repub110an d1ss1dents sought pub11c1ty of the1r own on
the very day ot h1s speeCh.

Senator Wherry oounterattaoked

by 1ntroduo1ng a resolution that would attempt to stymie the
Pre,s1dent I s troop proposal:

IIResolved, That 1 t 1s the Sense

ot the Senate that no ground toroes ot the Un1ted States
should be ass1gned to duty 1n the European area':tor the pur
poses of the North At1ant1c Treaty pend1ng the formulat10n

ot a polley w1th respect thereto by the Congress.~3l
29Fred ~. Israel (ed.), The State of the Un10n Mes
sages ot the Preslden~~ (New York: Chelsea House, 1966),
III, 2979.
30 The T1mes (London), January 9, 1951, p.

5.

31U. 8., Oong~essional Reoord, SEnd Cong., 1st Sess.,
XCVII, Part 1, ~~.

Eventually the resolutlon would surface ln modltled form,
but tor the tlme belng lt was all but 19nored by those con
cerned as both sldes seemed s~tlstled to oontlnue to debate
trom the tloor of the Senate.
Tatt's attaok ot Administratlon polley on January

5

was answered ln klnd by several pro-Admlnlstration,: senatore
on January 15.

Spearheadlng the ettort was Senator Douglas

ot Illinols, who warned that the 1 sSues lnvolved ln the
great debate Were ubroader than the survlval ot any pollt
10al phl10sophy."

The whole future ot western olv1l1zatlon

ltselt was at stake, aooordlng to Douglas.

Atter pay1ng due

homage to the cultures ot Asla, he sought to defend the
Adm1n1strat10n I s role ,ln Europe by reminding his oolleagues
ot the greatness o,t, western clvlllzatlon, albeit somewhat

bombastically:
. • • Mr. Presldent, lt is ln the West, lt ls among
the heirs ot a clvilizatlon cradled ln the Medlter
ranean and nurtured in the northern fastnesses ot
Europe, that the dignity, the worth, and the rights
ot the indivldual man have been most strongly asserted.
To tne people ot the West, 11te ls dear, and lt 0ught
not to be sold tor something that is not dear.' 2
He went on to argue that by being unWilling to send troops to
Western Europe, the United

!i

H
11

I

Stat~s

would be more likely to

cause a Russian attack rather than prevent one.

The Rus

slans had never been known to "spare' any country beoause it
was weak, olaimed Douglas.
sions

.'

EUrope needed Amer1can d1vi

not beoause these divisions by themselves would halt

32illd ., p. 243.
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any ,:future attack, bu t because" they would act as lithe vi tal

increment which would to a great extent create the Wil11ngness ot

, I

Weste~n

Europeans

t~

enlarge their armies."

Fur-

ther, it the Un1ted states d1d not' increase 1ts toroel ,1t
would probably cause the European po'tfers to do likewise and
oould well lead them to "throw 1n the sponge."3;
Senator Estes Kefauver agreed With Douglas and rose to
add that in his view the soviet Union was "bent on world
oonquest, It and 1ts weapons were lI'propaganda and brute
torce~"34

,

" 'I
,I
I

I
,

I

I
01

I

,

A Republican, Senator Wayne Morse, oonourred:

The danger that the Soviet Commun1sts Will resort
to war to advance their imperia11st1c a1m 1s of the
utmost grav1ty and real1ty. There 1s no doubt whatsoever that Commun1st 1mper1alism is out to spread
,over the world--over Europe and Asia by indirect
aggress10n 1:f'3POSS1ble, ultimately, I think, by war
if' neoessary. ,
Morsels statement was clearly meant to be in support

I

of the Administrat1on's posit1on.
he alone in tak'1ng suoh a

s~anoe.

Nor as a·Republican was
Taft was simply' unable to

oonvince a number of fellOW Republicans that Truman had misI"

read the importanoe of ;,the European defense pioture.

Such

laok ot po11tical cohesion did muoh to explain why Tart was
ultimately unable to' win the great debate.
One ot Tart IS tou'gheat an tagonlsts turned out to be
Republioan Governor Thomas Dew'ey of' New York.

In early Feb-

ruary Dewey made it plain he supported a joint a1r-seaground defense of Europe, ~~d that the deployment of such

33~., p. 239.

3~b1d., p. 261.

35~. , p. 257.

torces would require no approval from Congress.

Troop

deployment, ·argued the Governor in what, h~d to be a clear
slap at Taft, "was a job for experts and not tor po11t1
c1ans."36

The follow1ng even1ng (February 12) Dewey went

even further in his support tor NATO.

He was

quot~d

as

advooat1ng the al11ance "be extended along the Med1terranean
Sea and beyond 1ts eastern shores as a means of

re~uc1ng

the

land area upon which Russ1a m1ght have des1gns for aggres
sion."37

In other words, Dewey was seek1ng the 1nclus1on ot

Greece and

Tur~ey

1nto NATO'.

Dewey's statements_!'1ere among the strongest uttered by
one Repub11can aga1nst another dur1ng the course ot the
debate.

St1ll, h1s remarks were not 1ndicat1ve or a s1mple

two-way sp11t

1~

the party.

An analys1s by W1ll1am S. Wh1te

near the conclusion of the debate in late March tound the
Repub11oans. had hopelessly splintered into no less than tour
'fact1ons, With some overlap occurr1ng on many or the
p01nts. 3g .The picture emerg1ng, then, was 'that at Tatt
unable to rally the
with the

~anks

major1~y

ot the

ot h1s own party beh1nd h1m

Demo~rats

rema1n1ng almost so11d.

Many ot the votes that Tart 'had hoped to garner were
lost during the ,t1rst half of February when the Adm1nistra
t10n made a determ1ned etfort to squelCh his arguments once
,'.

36The New York T1mes, February 12, 1951, p. 1.
37~., February 13,1951, p. 1.
g

3. I.b1d., March 31, 1951, p. 4.
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and for all.

The

oft~ns1ve

began on a low key when General

Eisenhower returned from Europe and reported to a Jolnt scsI

slon of

Congre~s

hls observatlons ot European defense.

General stressed'equlpment, not men.
ern Europe be

s~pp11ed

The

He pleaded that West

wlth the latest mi11tary hardware

avallable to 1nsure Europe's 'soldlers would not be out
gunned by thelr Soviet counterparts.
added:

Almost ln passlng he

PI believe that the transfer of certaln of our unlts

should be in direct ratl0 to what Europe ls dolng so that we
know that we are all golng forward together, and no one ls
suspiclous ot the other. H39
The return of Eisenhower was qulCkly followed by a
serles ot j01nt hearlngs held by the Senate Forelgn Rela
tions an,d Armed Servlces Oommlttees ln whlch key mll1tary
and forelgn\affalrs personnel testlfled.

Secretary of

Defense George C. Marshall opened by reveallng for tbe flrst
t1me on February

15 exactly how many addltlonal troops the

Adminlstratlon was proposlng to send to Europe:
We already have there, on oocupatlon duty, about two
'dlv,lalons of gr,ound foroes. Our plans, based on the
reoommendation of the Jolnt Chlefs of Staff, there
fore contemplate send1ng four addltional dlvlslons to
Europe.
'
Whlle thls number does not appear to represent ln
pure flghtlng power a large oontrlbutlon to the 1m
medlate defensive strength of Western Europe, lt
does represent a small Army unlt of hlgh efflclenoy
and, we belleve, a tremendous morale contrlbutlon

39u • 8., Oongress10nal
XOVII', Part 1, 575. .

Recor~, S2d Oong. 1st 8ess.,

\

to the etfectiveness4Snd build-up of the projected
ground foroes. • • •
What Marshall did not say was that such a relatively
smal~ torce would undoubtedly oatoh the Taft foroes un

awares, whioh it did.

~att

and hi. supporters had been

expectlng Marshall to propose a tar larger toroe than he
dld, posslbly somethlng ln the nelghborhood of ten divi
slons.

When he asserted only four would be needed tor the

time belng, he ln e:rfect
forces:

spr~ng

a subtle t'rap on the Tatt

only a week before Tatt hlmself had oonfessed' he.

was prepared to allow "a tew more dlvlslons" to
out debate.

Eu~ope

With

SpeoitloallY,'on February g Taft had sald:

IIWlth regard to the sending ot troops to Europe wlthout any
oommltment no doubt the Presldent has power to send divl
slone to OocuPY Garmany, whloh it ls our obligatlon to
pollce and defend.

But lt oan hardly be claimed that this

power would Justlfy sendlng more than two or three addl
tlonal diVlslons. d41

The Admlnlstratlon slmply lncreased

Taft t f:I three di vlslon

t l gure

by one and then took the posl

tlon 1 t was really sending about the' same number he was
wllling to· allow anyway.

\nth thls one apt maneuver the

Admlnistratlon, and Marshall and Acheson ln partloular, had
cleariy outflanked Taft.

4oTh!peEartm!~t
p.

329.
41U.

s.,

Years later Acheson oonfessed:

ot State Bulletin,

Febr~ary 26,1951,

Congl\esslopal Record, p. 1119.
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W1th the Pr'esldent I B consent, General Marshall
revealed in public testimony what the Administration
had in mind., It was tour more divisions, making a
total of six. Neither he nor General Bradley would
be led into making that number a oeiling. It was
at the time, the meeting point of need and convenl-'
enoe; that po1nt could in the future move up or
down. They refused to speoulate. Senator Taft was
neatly oaught. IIA tew" 'frlaS more than two, three
anyway, Which reduoed the great strateg10 issue, as
had been stated by Presi.dent Hoover--ot holding the
oceans by air and sea power versus involvement on"
land--to an argument over one division to Europe.~2
Acheson went on to relate that onoe Tatt realized "his
predicament, ',. he attempted to overcome it by 'shifting the
1ssue,at stake in the

deba~e.

His "new pos1tion," ola1med

ACheson,. was one or challenging the Administrat1on's r1ght
to send any humber ot divisions Without the approval ot
Oongres,s.

Here Aoheson's reliability must be called to

question.

Tattls "new pos1tion ll was not

Il

n·aw" at all; it

was one ot the many issues he had linked to the debate over
troops right along.

It 'may well have been that atter Aohe

son and Marshall sprang their

tr~p

Tatt was rorced to shift

gears; but he oert.ainly did not bring up issues that he had
not already introduced.

Tp.e question ot Oongressional

approval was one, that Tatt had harped, on since the very
beginn1ng ot the debate, and he would continue to argue this
point until almost the very last.
In anY' even,t, the Administration continued to press 1ts
oase hard.

The very day atter Marshall I s testimony. the,

42Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1969). p. 495.
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Ohairman of the Joint Chi'ets of Statf, General Omar Bradley,
voiced the

view~hat

add1t1onal Amerioan troops were neces

sarr to reassure the Europeans ths Un1ted States intended to
belp them defend themselves.
oluded,

II

Furthermore, Bradley oon

this' increase in colleot1ve m1litary strength 1s

needed as a deterrent to the aggressive intentions ot Soviet
Russia'. u43
Bradley I a remarks Were to llowed with1n a 'lew days by
statements trom the oountry's three highest ranking air
foroe, navy, and. army off! oers. ,All three ot them agreed
with the Admin1stration 1 a proposal and all ooncurred that
air and sea power could not alone be counted on to save
Europe from RUBs1an ocoupation. 44 Senator Wherry, Who had
been invited to sit 1n on the testimony although he was not
a member of either partioipat1ng oommittee,

~ried

to preas

the Army Ohief of Statt, General J. Lawton Oollins, into
admitting it would be better to rely on "pulver1z1ng" the
Sov1ets with'atomio bombs than on oomm1tt1ng Amer1can troops
to Europe.

General Collins "persistently reJeoted suoh a

theory, say1ng to Senator Wherry that no amount ot bombing
ot the Russ1ans oould keep them from occupying Europe and
that bomb1ng alone oould never beat them. I,45
43The Departmen~ of Stat~Bull~t1n, February 26, 1951,

p.

331. 

~he New York T1mes, F'ebruary 20, 1951, p. 1.

45~., p. 5..
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Administration critics regained some hope when. the
·commanding general
of the St.

~teg1c

Air Command , General

Curtis E. LeMay, Was called to appear.

LeMay testitied that

while'he agreed with the Presidentls decision to send tour
more

div181ons~
\

contemplat~d

he also believed that allot the torces

tor Europe's defense at that time would','not be

adequate to stop a Russian invasion.
these divisions

wo~ld

In the general's mind

represerit a "holding

torce~H

while the

"main blowlt would h,ave to come. from strat egic bombing. 46
LeMay, then, ot all. the military officers called to testity
before the two commi ttee~_, was the only one who even came
close to

su~porting

the Taft theSiS.

But even he did not

advanoe the possibility that any future war in Europe could
be won by air and sea power alone.
Attar questioning and listening to the various gen
erals, Senator Wherry. still was not satisfied.
plained trom the Senate floor late. in March:

He com
"The dominant

voioes in the Pentagon, General Marshall, General Bradley,
and General Collin's, all ground officers by training, have
their eyes glued to the ground, when they should wake up to
the aeronautioal tacts ot lite.

.

deterrent to World War III.R

I

4<7

Our air power is the chiet

Other senatbrs were even more upset by the military
testimony.

They viewed the oommittee hearings as a sham,

46~., February 22, 1951, p. 1.
~1u. S., Oon~essi~nal Re~, Part 3, p. 2907·
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feeling the generals were bound to say whatever they were
told to say.

,1

Of E1senhower 1 s inspeot10n and fact-f1nding

tr1p to Europe, for 1nstanoe, Senator George W. Malone

!

blustered:
The purpose rot the tr1p] Was obv10usly to seoure
support for a !ec1s10n whioh was tully deoided upon
beforehand. I do not believe that anyone 1s na1ve
enough to th1nk a week or two jumping from one .
European oapital to another, oould aooomp11sh any
purpose other than that ot propaganda tor the pre
oonoeived deoision ot the State Department t04!end
our boys to make Up a Mag1not 11ne in Europe.
Malone, Wherry, and a tew others were making a po1nt, but it
Was a point born ot frustrat1on'rather than rea11ty.

It Was

ot oourse difficult to know preo1sely how muoh ot the mi11
tary testimony refleoted the,aotual thoughts of the generals
and how much of 1t had besn "preoonce1ved" by the Adm1n1stra
t1on.

What Malone and Wherry refused to admit, however, was

that it was the duty ot these off·lcers to follow the dio
tates ot the1r Commander-in-Ch1ef; if they had truly opposed

.

his mi11tary and po11t1cal dec1sions, they should have
resigned.
!he Acheson Test1monl .
The h1gh water mark ?f test1mony tavorable to the
Adm1n1strat10n 1 s pos1t1on undoubtedly occurred on February
,

·1

. 16 when Dean Aoheson read a long prepared statement in wh1ch
he oaretully out11ned the need tor addit10nal troops in
Europe.

It was to beoome the Adm1n1strat1on's det1nit1ve

.4g~., Part 1, p. 952..

/

statement on the 1ssu·e.
Aoheson's remarks were awaited with greatest ant10ipa
tion by his senatorial foes.

Muoh of this was due to the

symbo11c quai1ty assoc1ated w1th'h1m; whether he wanted to
be or not, he had. beoome 1n the minds of many the Ilohief
arohiteot" of the Truman foreign polioy.

Hls enem1es were

also fond of reoal11ng that on a similar oocasion in 1949,
Acheson had committed one of the major blunders of his
career.

When asked at that time by Senator R1ckenlooper, in

conneotion with the or1ginal rat1flcation of the NATO paot,
1f the Unlted States would ever be' expected to send substan
t1al nwnbers\ of troops to Europe lias a more or less perma
nent contr1bution, II Aoheson replied:

"The answer to that

questlon, Senator, is a olear and absolute INo., 1149 This
unfortunate response was inoreasingly to haunt him for the
next two years.

His,. opponent s would

He Was later to oand1dly adm1t!

~ot

let him torget 1t.

".Even as a short-range

prediotion th1s answer was deplorably wrong.
equallY stUP1d. lI5Q

It was almost

Now' onoe aga1n he was to testify regard

lng NATO, and naturally his opponents were hopeful of
another errorln judgment, one that would prove fatal to
both NATO and the Seoretary of State.

But this time he was

to disappo1nt t.hem.
;.

4e u. 5., Congress, Senate Oomm1ttee on Fore1gn Rela
t10ns, Hearinglt on the North Atlant10 Treaty, Slat Cong.,
1st Sess., p.
•
5PAcheson, p. 285.
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Baslcally, Acheson framed hls 11ne of attack With the
same reasonlng.the generals had employed,betore the same
committees.

He argued the Unlted States had to depend upon

a "balanced collective force. n And 'whl1e he frankly oon
ceded that tor the present Amerioa enjoyed a Psubstant1al
. lead in air power and in atomlc weapons," thls advantage
would gradua11y be lost over a perlod of leal'S.

It was

therefore important to continue to deter aggresslon after
this advantage had been

dlmlni~ed.

The only way to do so

would be with a balanced force that had as much m11itary
muscle on the ground as on the sea and 1n the air.

He went

on to note that crlt1cs had labeled such a program as 11lu
s10nary because its foroes s1mply could not be made large
enough to offset those of the Soviet Union.

The trouble

I

with auch reasoning, he asserted, Was that it oonvenlently
separated
d~fense

Eu~opean

network.

defense from the rest of the American
European defense foroes oould not be con

sidered in 1solat10n, as a weapon all by themselves; rather,
they had to be seen as a "v1tal adjunct to the other' deter
rent torces ava11able." 51. Summing U!?, he renewed this plea:
In the event ot an attaok the availab1l1ty ot defense
forces in Europe would. g1 ve us time that we would
Vitally need to bring our other forces into opera
tion. In the meantime these. defense torces would
oblige the aggressor to.use up hls available re
.sources, while his home sources of supply were
being bombed. These forces would also deny him
51Dean Acheson, "The Joint Detense ot Western Europe "
The DeRartment of State Bulletin, February 26, 1951, p. 324.

access to the industrial, human, and other resources
of Europe. These are the resources that balance the
scales of power. These are the forces that would
prevent Europe, ln the event of an attack, trom hav
1ng to go through another occupat1on and llberation. 52
Acheson's presentation

l~S

on the whole a masterful

performanc6# one that left his crlt1cs with little new to
assault.

Of course they could not and d1d not accept his

arguments, but ne1ther could they tind anything weak enough
in them to win over those' senators wb:o had been up to that
time noncommlttal on the troop issue.

Clearly, the Secre

tary·a test1mony was a tour de force, an accompllshment
which effectlvely sealed the fate of the entlre- debate.

In

/

retrospect, however, his case was not wlthout flaws.
Early in his

r~marks,

for example, Acheson cautloned

his audience by suggest10ng that the danger confrontlng West
ern Europe was not just the obvlous one of overt m1l1tary
a.ggresslon.

There were also sev:eral other threats':

. . • conquest by default, by pressure, by persua
sion, by sub'l(erslon, by "neutralism, II by all. the
paraphernalia of lndirect aggression which the'Com
munlst movement has used.53
If the Unlted States engaged in a sort ot one dlmena,lonal
strategy whlch 19nored these other factors, then it could
I

I

only be expected that 'such a policy would drlve "our frlends
ln Europe lnto a mood of non-reslstance, a mood ot Ineutral
ism, I which 1s for them and tor all of us a short cut to
suic1de. ,,~\ Acheson's successor, John Foster Dulles, once

53 Ibld., p. 32:;.

54 Ibld •

-

referred to neutra11sm as being "1mmoral" and was subjected
to such a fusillade of verbal br1ckbats that he never
troubled to

b~oach

the subject w1th such terminology again.

Yet, oddlY', no one thought to challenge Acheson I s groundless
assumpt10n.

Presumably, even his opponents thought sU1cide

to be an accurate

predi~tion

of the fate ot neutral

countr1es •
. The poss1b1lity that Europe would somehow be "sub
verted l • by internal Communist movements was also extremely
remote 1n 1951, desp1te what Acheson sa1d.

Indeed, with1n

one month ot h1sstatement, h1s own Depa.rtment of State had
1

-

'

1ssued stat1stics which cast serious doubt on such a
b1lity.

poss1~

After explaining to the reader that Moscow 't;as

"losing the battle to take Over Western Europe by boring
from with1n," an official commun1que stated that since 194-6
Communist party membersh1p had declined by

34

per

~ent

1n

Austr1a, 30 per cent 1n France, 31 per cent 1n Italy, 65 per
cent 1n

No~waYJ ~

per cent 1n Western Germany, and 34 per

cent 1n the United K1ngdom. 55 But once aga1n, 1n so far as
1s known, not one of the Admin1stration's conservative oppo
nents.. attempted to nake an 1ssue ot th1s apparent
disorepancy.

55110omm un1sm on the \I[ane 1n ~lestern Europe, II The
Department ot state Bullet1n,.I4arch 12, 1951, p. 40~

I

~enate

Resolut1on

22

Atter the Senate Fore1gn Relations and Armed Foroes
Comm1ttees had sat through most o·t the month of February
listening to and questloning Dean Aoheson, George Marshall

.

and

a.. bevy ot generals, it beoame obvious mo st s ena tors had

made up their minds in favor at the Administration's pro.
posal.
mous.

Indeed, the deols1on ot the Committees was unani
By a vote of 23 to' 0 they elected to leave the govern

ment "..tree to oomml t l<lhatever fo'rces were tneoessary and
appropr1~tel"

effort.55
nOl~

to uphold Amerioals t.air share of the NATO

T~uman had overpowered Taft and his allles and it

seemed only a matter of time before he would go ahead

and order the tour addltional divisions to'Europe.

The

debate oontinued trom the tloor ot the Senate for approxl
. mate:;t.y 'a month, but' as the days drifted by it beoame lnoreas
ingly obvious that .few people were really paylng attent1on.
The whole Ta.ft-Wherry-Knowland effort seemed to dislntegrate
after the hearings oonoluded.
A politioal autopsy 'at the debate quickly reveals why.
At best Taft 'was able to count bnlonly about one-thlrd ot
the Senate to see the' matter his way.

Not'all of the remain

ing two-thirds were necessarily on the slde at the Admln'la
,

.

tratlon, but neither was Taft able to win them over.
big tact or was hls lnabl1ity to tind any professional
5~The New York Times, March

9, 1951, p. 1.
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military men who would Champion his views.

(MacArthur ot

course was still in Korea, but he took no d1rect part 1n the
great debate.) 'Without some m1litary support, Tattls pos1
tion beoame unt~nable.

As one opserver has summar1zed:

. Faced with exeout1ve unanim1ty and the staunch
defense ot the Administration's position by three ot
the nation's tour most popular soldiers (Marshall,
Eisenhower, Bradley), the opposition senators failed
to det1ne any olear alternatives to the Adm1nistra
t10n's aotion, muoh less to influenoe or to reverse
the character ot that action.57
The tinal act of the great debate ooourred on Apr1l 4
When the Senate; by a vote of 69 to 21, approved Senate
Resolut1on

99.

The resolution had first squeaked through
,,_ ....

two days earlier by the th1n margin of 46 to 44, but a
coa11tion reported to be composed of Repub11cans and South
ern Demoorats rorced the Senate to reoons1der and to adopt
a deolaration subm1tted by Senator John L. McClellan ot
Arkansas. 5't! The MoClellan amendment, whioh turned out to be
a stipulat10n call1ng upon the Pres1dent to seek congres
s10nal approval for any further troop inoreases to Europe,
was adopted by

49

to

43. It 'was then attaohed to the full

resolution which passed by a final· tally ot some forty-e1ght
votes.

The resolution wh10h thus emerged Was the ult1mate

outgrowth

or the one Senator Wherry had first 1ntroduoed 1n

January.

It had, ,however,

b~oome

so amended over the months

51samuel P. Hunt1ngton, The Oommon Defense (New York:
Oolumb1a Univers1ty Press, 1961), pp. 324:;25. 
5~The ~ew York T1mes, Apr11 3,'1951, p. 1.

,
,

'
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that \'lherry himself could no longer support it.

On the

other hand, Taft and Knqwland viewed it as the best possible
under the circumstances and voted tor its adoption.

Others

may have been puzzled' over Just what it did,. but voted for
1t anyway.

As t.,ith most measures that eventually work their

\t18.y through the legislative proces.s, Resolution 99 came
tnrough as a comprom1se

l

one, as'Dean Acheson later remarked,

that "had 1n it a,present for everybody".1t

Acheson's comment

would seem to explain the resolution's flnallopslded
aoceptance.
The resolut1on l being just exactly that, vOlced the
sense of the Senate and had absolutely no leglslative power.
It approved the selection of General Eisenhower as the Com
mander ot NATO; it noted the existence ot a threat to the
secur1ty of the United States and its NATO partners which
necessitated comm1tting units of "armed Forces as may be
necessary and proper" but warned that not more than four
d1v1sions should be deployed IIwithout further Congressional
approval II ; it noted the President should consult lr1th the
Seoretary of Defense, the JOint Chiefs, and appropr1ate con
g.ress10nal committees before sending troops abrcad; it asked
the JOint Chlets to ascertain 11' other NATO members were
providing the1r oontribut1on; it requested semiannual
reports on the implementation ot the NATO treaty; and
asked that considerat10n be given for the
I

I

I

II

in~lusion

01'

1~

West
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Germany and Spain lnto the paot,.Sg
As there was no actual leglslatlon, lnvolved, the

i

. j

Adm1nlstratlon could have 19nored the resolutlon entlrely
had lt so deslred.
IS

vlotory.

Instead, it wlsely Chose to acoept lt as

The Presldent !asued a statement

~h1ch

sald in

part:
The clear endorsement of the appolntment or General
Elsenhower and the plans to assign troops to his com
mand shows that there has never been any real questlon
but that thls country would do its part ln h~lplng to
create an lntegrated European defense toroe. b 9
In an editorlal on the same ,day, The New York Times
optlmlstlcally

repor~ed:

I1Even with 'its amendments •

.

.

the adoptlon of the resolutlon should provlde l"estern Europe
wlth new confldence to go tull steam ahead Wlth the defense
programs agreed upon. K61 ~he T1me~' edltors apparently had
not been doing thelr homework; Western Europe by this date
was paying 11ttle attentlon'to the outcome of the great
debate, so 1nvolved had lt beoome with its own difficulties
over NATO. ,France, clinging to bitter memories fostered by
Worl~

War II, remained wary over the role West Germany was

to play ln the alllance.

Other members, Great Brita1n in

partioular, had become disturbed ,over the lncreased costs
NATO would mean.

By the spring of 1951, regardless of the

59The resolutlon ln lts entlrety'may be round ln the
Appendlx.
P~The DeEartment of State Bulletin, Aprll 16, 1951,

p.

637· - 

61llTroops for turope, It The New York Times, Aprl1 5,
1951, p. 2S.

I
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I

l

I

I!
II

outoome

o~

the great dtbate, Europe indioated little likeli

hood. of proceeding at "full stea,m ahead. II

It soon became

olear that the transformation of NATO into any meaningful
m111tary a111&006 was to be an agonizi,ngly slow prooess.
In the

United!~tates,

diverted attention.

tOOt another matter soon

Within a week of the passage of Reso-,

lut10n 99 the entire affair was momentarily forgotten fol
i1

!

!
I
I

II!
,'1

lowing the President's removal of General MaoArthur from his
oommand.

Unoffioially, the great debate was now over, but

the fresh oontroversy wh1ch arose from'MaoArthur's .dismissal
indioated some of the disputed issues oould not be resolved

by the passage

ot a congress1onal resolut1on.

CHAPTER IV
AN APPRAISAL
~he great debate. then, d1d not really
conolude w1th
,
.

the passage of Resolut1on 99 on. April 4.

To be sure, the

qUest10n whether tour addit10nal divisions would be sent to
-'

Europe Was settled. but ·the question whether Europe or ASia
had first priority in Amer1ca l s defensive strategy continued
to be hotly debated.

With Truman's dismissal ot MacArthur

the Whole affair was opened anew, more vociterously than
ever.
ot

The resulting uproar was to last well into the summer

1951 and the consequences of this hectic period were to

haunt the Truman Adm1nistration until its last days in
otfice.

Yet the debate itself had grappled with, or cre

ated. a number ot 1mp'ortant 1ssues, some of wh1ch Were to
help formulate American foreign policy for the next fifteen
years.

The debate's effect on the 1mmadiate future of the
I

Repub11can and Democratic parties was also

not~ble.

The Q,uestion of the Soviet Thr.eat
During the debate muoh of what Taft, Hoover, Knowland,
and others protested concerned
additional troops 1n Europe.

~he

quest10n ot the

It will be recalled

pee~

~hat

for

Taft

in particular argued that he could tind no sign the Soviets
were preparing any overt military aotion against Western
Europe.

In his mind the threat Which ex1sted was in the Far
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East.

Olearly, the results of the debate show the Adminis

tration won the argument, at least in so tar as a majority
of the Senate was concerned.

Yet what is not olear, even

after a hiatus ot some nlneteen years, is Whether lts evalu
atlon was sound.

Was there, in taot, any serious possibil

lty of a Soviet invaslon of Western Europe during the early

1950's?
The only tact that can be stated fQr certain is that
there was a climate ot tear and suspicion prevalent in the
Unlted states.

Thls in itself was probably enough to CaUBe

the Administration to assume an attack would occur.
flndings ot, the National Security

'Counci~,

The

as relayed in lts

paper NSO-6g, were undoubtedly an important contributing
taotor.

Unfortunately, this entlre paper still remains

classified, even though less than one per cent of it origi
nated from class1f1ed sources. l Acoording to Dean Acheson,
this'informat1on put the need tor a stronger alllance Dbeyond
argument."

At best, then, the hard evldence tor the neces

sity ot sendlng American

tor~es

to Europ'e Was based upon a

super secret port1on of NSC-6g.

Until this information is

I

declassified, it seems doubtful any tinal conclUSion can be
reached in r.egard to the posslbility of a SOViet attack dur
~ng

this per10d.

lDean Acheson, Present at the Oreatlon (New ~ork:
W. W. Norton & Oompany, 196~', p. 375.

76
The Role ot the

Troo~s

Taft had also argued that even 1f a Soviet attack oame,
six Amer1can d1visions would never be capable of stopp1ng

. it.

Tatt's view in this 1nstance seems sensible.

Even With

addit10nal divisions-supplied by the various nations ot
Western Europe, lt 1s stl1l diffioult to understand how a
massive Soviet 1nvas1en could have been conta1ned.

In

answer to th1s po1nt Administrat10n supporters, such as General Luo1us Clay, sought to assure the Senate that an American foroe, even

su~h

a

sm~l

one, would be so sk11led and

tenac10us that it would be capable

or

sustain1ng "the rather

slow moving Russian attaok" until additional allied torces
oould be brougnt to bear. 2 In light of the American mi11tary's less than br111irutrecord against a tar less soph1sticated opponent 1n Korea, Clay's statement seems part1oularly absurd.
A more plausible

e~lanat1on

hinged on a polit1cal motive.

tor the sending ot troops

At least one oolumn1st saw

the long-term 1mplioations of the issue at the t1me:

In the most, 11teral sense they [the six d1visions]
are the vanguard ot a potent1al army t~at m1ght never
have oome 1nto ex1stenoe if they were not there. As
a military·foroe they are not b1g enough to w1n a
land war, but as a political torce, the nuoleus at
larger arm1es, the generator ot con~1denoe and the
will to resist, they oould be a potent faotor in

. 2The New York Times, MarCh 1, 1951, p. l6.

\

,
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aav1ng the peaoe. 3

S1m11arly, another observer noted, perhaps more succinctly,
that Amer1ca 1 s role 1n prov1d1ng troops to NATO was, 1n
effect,

II

a deterrent 'commitment based on the beliet that 1t

Ameri can 1nt ent10ns to prevent the upset ot the European
balance of power were made olear 1n advance, the 11ke11hood

II

of a challenge to that balanoe would be greatly reduced. 14

f

More recently, other lfr1ters, including some tram the

I

I~

'I I

so-oalled " rev is10n1st" scho~l of h1story, have come up With

i

! 1

!

a related motive tor the Admin1strat10n's act10ns.
group 1s ot the op1n1on that Amer1can

troop~

Th1s

were primar1ly

sent to Europe to serve as -hostages- in order to 1nsure
all-out Amer1can part1c1pation 1n case ot any m111tary con
f11ct.

Specifically, the reasoning ot th1s group 1s Just

the oppOsite of what General Olay's had been:

small numbers

ot Amer1can troops would never be able to w1thstand any

massive Sov1et attack, nor were they meant to!

Their role

was to act as a, ·"tr1pw1re" whose purpose would be to guar
antee the tull m1ght of the Amer1can

m1l1t~ry

would come

orashing down on any torce wh1ch attempted to rout them from
the oont1nent.

Ultimately, ot course, th1s meant that Many

SoV1et attaok upon a NATO command oonta1n1ng American troops
3Anne OtHare McOormiok, liThe Po11t10al Miss10n of Those
'S1x D1v1sions,' !he New York Times, February 17,1951, p. 14.
4Samuel P. Huntington, The Oommon Detens2 (New York:
Oolumb1a Univers1ty Press, 1901), p. 3IJ:
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would automatically trip a nuclear attack trom the Unlted
States. 1I 5
In other words, the loss ot a slzeable number ot
Amerioan soldiers, coupled with the realization that ada

.

quate numbers ot additional troops oould not be despatched
tast enough trom the United States to hold the contlnent,
would probably be r'eason, as one observer put lt, to

II

cre _

ate the-oasus belli atomlc!, at whlch point the Strategic
Alr Command would take over and unleash an atomlc attack. a6
This theory seems oredlble, espeo1ally s1nce at least
one hlgh-level member of the Truman Adm1nistratlon has been
-

unable or unw1lling to respond to it.7

What emerges trom

all of thls, however, is the ourious irony that 1t the logio

ot the revision1sts ls aocepted, ,then in the end the

Adm1n

1 strati on !!!. relying on the oapab1llty of the Amerioan Air
force to deliver a devastatlng nuclear attack on the SOViet
I
I I

I

Il
.I

Unlon, the strategy Taft ·had advanced all along.

Taft

l.,anted .the United States to be prepared to carry out th1s

I

I

1,

I

I

Ii

I,

1

Ii
l
1

I

I

;i
I j
Ij
• 1

I

~

I

!

St'lalter LaFeber~ America., Russia, and the Cold War.
1945-1966 (New Y~~k: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967),

p.

l23L
'I

PRaymond Aron

'

'

The Great Debate (New York:

J
& Company, Inc., 1905),
p.

23. '

Doubleday

7When asked ab~ut the revision1st theory by the
author Seoretary Aoheson referred him to several chapters
in his' new book Present at the Creation. All proved to be
usetul but none -unforiunate!y, dealt with the rev1sionist
"triPwire" explslllition. Nor could the author find evidence
of a response to the theory by any other Administratlon
defender.
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actlon wl thou't sacr1flo1ng ground personnel 1n the prooess.
The Adm1n1stratlon, on the other hand, apparently ~~lt that
suoh ~n attaok would never rece1ve the polltlcal and pub11c
assent necessary Within the United States unless Amer1can
troops had already been k1lled by a Sov1et aggressor force.
Both strateg1es'assumed Amer1can air power would have the
capabl11ty to carr.y out such a

~1ss1on.

Fortunately, the

a1r torce was never asked to prove this content1on.
The Execut1ve and the Senate
In question1ng the

~res1dentts

r1ght to send troops

anywhere w1thout the approval of the Senate, Taft and his
supporters were-employing a tact10 that was anything but new.
He was merely st1rrlng up embers which period1cally through
out Amer1can h1story have

ign~ted

over the const1tutlonal

question of the right or the exeout1ve branch to take mili
tary act10n w1thout the approval of the legislat1ve branch.
Truman, already annoyed w1th Tart and oompany over a
variety or 1ssues, saw little need to subm1t the troop ques
t10n tor their approval.

The President made h1s posit1on

olear 1n a press conferenoe in January, 1951:
Q.. Mr. Pres1dent, maybe 1t t s my "t1n II ear, but
I d1dn't get th1s stra1gnt yet. In, th1s part10ular
case, with the d~bate rag1ng 1n Congress over
whether you do or do not have the author1ty to send
troops to Europe--and Mr. Hoover sald not another
man or another dollar shou14 be sent--the debate has
been qu1te general. Do I understand that you will
ask Congress for perm1ssion-
THE PRESIDENT. No.
Q. -~before send1ng troops-

gO
THE PRESIDENT. No, you do not want to take that
View ot the thlng. I sald that--ln case ot neces
slty and lt beoame neoessary, for the defense ot the
Atlantl0 Treaty oountries, the Oongress would be
consulted qefore troops were sent. I don't ask
the1r E~rmlsslon! I just consult them-raffiphas1s
added).
--- Lom,
,
Truman went on to note ln the same news oonference that
it Senators Taft and Wherry, or anyone else,

wanted to

discuss this matter with him "the tront door of the Wh1te
I

House (was J always open."

A publio invitation ot this sort

\

was not w,hat Tart had 1n mind.

He desired a pr1vate invl t~-

,

tion whereby he and the Presldent would arr1ve at some
mutual arrangement ·1n regard to the troops question.

In

tact, the whole not1on that 1t was Trumants duty to gain the
consent of Oongress really meant the oonsent of the GOP
leadershiP.9

As 1t was, Truman said nothing at his plans

conoerning the troop lssue to the Republloan leadership
until after a declsion had already been made and oommun1
oated to the other NATO

member~.

Truman's actions were a

olear ind1catlon the harmonious days when the President and
Senator Arthur Vandenburg worked out a bipartisan foreign
po11cy were nothing more than fond memories.

It seemed

olear, as one observer has noted, that "the procedures and

s.,

Pr,es1dent, "The Pres~dentls News Oonference ot
1951,u ~ubliQ Pape£s of !~e P~es~dents Ofgth§
~~!ted State~1--Har~. ~ruman (Washington: Un1ted tates
guo

January 11
/1

906011 V. 'Crabb, B1~tls'ai1 r9.re~B!! Pollcy:._ ,Mzth or
Realltl' (Evanston: Row, Peterson and ~ompany, 1957),

1

p.

I

91iO. 

gl
teChn1ques designed to promote

t~o-party

cooperation in for

eign 'affairs had fallen into almost complete disuse, and
neither the Administration nor Republican leaders showed any
evident desire to restore them. ulO
The reaction in the

Se~ate

to the President'a policy

was mixed, even in his own party.

Senator J. William FUl

bright was firmly in his corner:
!l:he Congress has the right and power to raise the
Armed Forces, but the President has the responsi
bility for the command of those forces. If in the
exeroise of his best judgment the defense of th+s
oountry requires the sending Of troops to Europe,
he has the power and the duty to do so. Congress,
of oourse, can refuse to appropriate the money for
the troops but that is a deoision for which Con
gress must take the re~onsibi11ty. In the long
run deois1ons PO military strategy are best left to
the Executive.~l.
, I,

Senator Paul Douglas, normally an Administration
baoker, Was not so sure.

r

t
I

I

issue because Seoretary AoheSon had stated before a oongreB
sional oommittee in 1949 that Amerioan troops would never be
sent to Europe under the NATO paot.

!

!!

Now it was obvious

troops were going to be sent and apparently without oongres
sional sanot1on.

I

He felt uneasy over the troop

·Consequent~y,

Douglas felt:

• • • it would not be proper, in my judgment, for
the administration now to try 'to put the agreement
into etfect by purely Executive act10n upon the nar
row grounds of its oonst1tutional powers. For.~o do
, so would violate the explioit pledg~ given by '::~:::
lOIbid.

-

llU. S., Oongressional Record, g3d Cong., 1st Sess.,
XCVII, Part 1, 520-521.

S2
the Secretar.y to the Senate when we had the pOwer or
refusing to ratify the treaty under Which the Brus
sels agreement was later negot1ated. It would be
the path' of honor instead for the adm1n1strat1on to
submlt the question of approv1ng the Brussels agree
m~nt to at ll~st the S~nate and poss1bly the
House. • • '.

In the

end Truman chose a compromise, but one which

Was tav6rab~e to hls position.

With the Admln1stration's

approval the lssue Was allowed to be a1red 1n the jo1nt
hearlngs ot the Armed Forces and Forelgn Relatlons Commit
tees.

Slnce both commlttees were made up of men largely

tavarab~e

to the Adm1nistration l s pos1tlon, thls action

almost 1nsured a pro-Adm1nistration outcome, thereby neatly
outmaneuverlng Taft.

The mowe also had the additlonal

advantage ot pac1fy1ng d1ss1dent Democrats, such as Douglas,
who now telt the Senate had been properly consulted.
Tattls allegatlon that the Senate had not been given
1ts const1tutional due was further weakened when many promi
nent Republicans, ,convinced by the hear1ngs, tinally voted
for Resolution 99.

Thls avo1ded a Showdown struggle 1n the

Senate whlch probably would have resulted in a bitter par
tisan wrangle ot considerable

duratlon~

But because ot

Truman's apt handling ot the issue and because of the sup

I,

I
I
i

posed Soviet threat to Western Europe, many "Republican
senators dld not dare to r1sk the consequences of defeatlng
the treaty. nl 3 Some at them were probably teartul of
l2IblC!. ~ p. 230.
l3Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorlal Polltlcs and Forelgn
Pol1ol (n.p., Unlversity of-Xentucki~ess, 1962), p. 38.

g~

talli'ng v1ctim to a

II

soft ~n oommunism" oharge at some 1st er

date' if they refused to support a mi11tary alliance aga1nst
it at this time.
Aftereffeots
The long term 1mplications.ot the great debate tor
both internal American politics and foreign affairs are
adm1ttedly difficult to surmisel

On the surface, as has

already been shown, the Adm1n1strat'1on was v1ctorious.

It

sucoeeded 1n its des1re to move addit10nal troops to Europe,
a move wh1ch turned out to be a th1n enter1ng wedge in l'1ght'

ot the numbers of American troops which were to follow over
the years.

A broader examinat1on,

howe~er,

along with those issues whlch

led~

suggests the debate,

up to and followed it,

proved to be d1sastrous to the Democratic Party.

For

although some oonservative Republ1cans were earnestly seek-

1ng a 'change 1n America's defense posture, it seems olear
that 1n a larger sense they saw the great debate as yet

another opportunity to make political bay for the
tions.

1952 eleo-

Every time the Administration was d1scredited, the

!

i.

Republ10an Party was assured ot addltional votes.

One care-

ful student of the period, histor1an Ronald J. Caridi, has
frankly oonoluded this/was the major motivation of the

Republican

d1ss1~e~ts.

Commenting on the party's attitude

toward Korea in part1oular, Caridi remarked:-

g4
They first ~upported the American intervention,
then retreated trom the implioations of that sup
port; they st~adtastly called for Amer10an W1th
drawal • . • ~hen passlonately assooiated tnemselves
wl th the "no substitute for viotorytl philosophy ot
MaoArthur. Finally . • • the party nom1nated tor
the Presldenor a military hero lfhoae plattorm lacked
any concrete program tor peace even as 1t d1savowed
both uniticat~on and an all-out victory. Critio1sm
by the Republican party dur1ng the Korean War Was
'justi:fiable; ;rut When the nature of a party 1 s dis
sent 1ndlcate,s that lt s members are motlvated more
by polltlcal lexpedlency than by 'a deslre to present
a oonslstent iand vlable alternative to A~lnlstra
tlon pollcles, then censure ls ln order.
Oensure

may

have been ln order, but when lt came the

Amerlcan publlc, vla the ballot box, dlrected lt agalnst the
Demoorats.

The Repub11can Party's electlon vlotorles ot
i

1952 lndlcated that lts strategy had been successful.
may, ln fact, have been too suocesstul.
observer has noted:

It

As one foreign

"Not only dld lt do untold eleotoral

damage to the Democratl0 Party but lt lald the basls for a
slgnlfloant change 1n Amerloan [torelgn~ polloy. N1 5 Dean
Acheson, wrltlng ln hls memolrs, admlts the perlod was a
pOlsonous one and lt "had a highly toxlc etfeet on the
Amer1can

public~u

dence at home and
a~talrs

Stlll, he found that the "loss of oonfl
ab~oad

ln the conduot of our forelgn

was ,not the prox1mate oause of any Change 1n our

torelgn pollcy, but lt added to our d1ff1oult1es and by so
14aonald J. Caridi, The Korean War and Amerloan Poll
The Republlcan Partz as a Case s~ (Phl1adelphla:
Un1vers1ty ot Pennsylvanla Press, 1968), p. 175.

1;Ies:

15The Times (London), September 6,195 4, p. 7.
I,

"

.
I

~

I
I

i

dolng dlmlnlshed our etteotlveness.u16
Perhaps there was no notloeable ohange ln the direotlon
of forelgn polloy dur1ng the remalnlng year and a halt ot
the Truman Admlnlstratlon, but a subtle ohange was oocur
rlng.

A whole set of attltudes oonoerned wlth the menace ot

Oommunlsm ln Asla began to permeate the upper eohelons of
government.

Korea, ot course, started lt, but the attacks

and campalgns of Taft, Hoover, Knowland, and

thel~

followers

must Share a good deal ot the responslbll1ty for that

i'

I

!

,

change.

Largely because of the momentun of the1r propa

ganda, Amer1can fore1gn po11cy beoame reorlented, with a
greater emphas1s placed upon the 1mportance of As1a.

Once

the war·in Korea was term1nated w1th a state of permanent

•!
i

j

truoe,.the Un1ted States d1d not remove its presence from
AS1a; 1t 1noreased it:

fifty thousand troops rema1ned 1n

Korea; Ch1ang Kal-shek cont1nued to receive vast amounts ot

;j

m111tary and econom1c aid; the French were f1rst a1ded and

•I

eventually replaced ln a hopeless attempt to suppress IIQom_

r

munlst subvers1on,!1 ln .Southeast As1a; and the SEATO al11ance
system was estab11shed ln an effort to do for the ent1re
reg10n what NATO had supposedly done for Western Europe.
In short, the whole concept of combatlng Commun1sm by oon
ta1nment, wh1ch had or1ginally been 'deslgned tor events in
Europe, was also a40pted for Asia under the dlreot1on of the
16Acheson, p. 52S.

E1senhower Adm1nistration.

Later Democratic regimes not

only adcepted all of this as worthwhile but sought to expand
America's role there as well.

No thought was apparently

given to the posSib1lity that by so do1ng th,e Un1ted States
m1ght

ser1ouslY'ove~extend

1tself.

In essence, then, most o.L' the argument:s 1n regard to
a~cepted

As1a advanced by Tart and h1s troupe were

and

eventually put 1nto pract1ce by later adm1nistrat10ns.
(~ven the much touted super10rity of a1r power was given

another chance in Vietnam--where it met wit4 only marg1nal
success.)

The irony ot the great debate wa~ that while Tart

and h1s supporters lost tbe battle 1n 1951 over the troops
to-Europe 1ssue, they 1n ettect won the war".
championed as never before, perhaps beyond
1magined poss1ble.

As1a Was to be

any~hing

Tart had

Aside :from the troop 1s,sue, the 'only

concept advanced by Taft and Hoover during

~he

that was not later aCknowledged ,as gospel was

great debate

~he

proposi

tion that excessive defense spending woUld become selt
destructive.

Yet this may well bave been

1cant prediction.

!

•

I

~heir

most sign1r
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APPENDIX
SENATE RESOLUTION 99 AS AMENDED
"

Resolved That-
1.

the Senate approved the aotion ot the President ot

the United States in oooperating 1n the oommop defensive
effort

or

the North Atlant10 Treaty nations by designat1ng,

at their'unanimous request, General ot the Army Dwlght D.
E1senhower a~ Supreme Allled Command:er, ,Europe, and 1n plac
ing Armed Forces ot the Un1ted States in Europe under hie
oommand;
2.
the

it ls the bellet ot the Senate that the threat to

seo~rity

of the Un1ted States and our North Atlantio

Treaty partners makes 1& necessary tor the United States to
• .#'

station abroad such unit's ot our Armed Forces as may be
necessary and appropriate to contribute our ta1r share of
the forces needed tor the j01nt defense ot the North
Atlantic area;

3. 1t is the sense ot the Senate that the Pres1dent'
of the Un1ted States as Oommander in Chief ot the Armed
Forces,

betor~

taking aotion to send units ot ground troops

to Europe under art10le 3 ot the North

Atla~t1c

Treapy,

should oonsult the Seoretary ot Defense and the J01nt Ch1ets
of Statt, the Oommittee on Foreign Relations, ot the Senate,
the Oomm1ttee on Fore1gn Affairs ot the House of Representa
t1ves, and the Armed Servioes Oomm1ttees ot the 'Senate and

92
the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise
oonsult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europej

4. it is the sense of the Senate that betore sending
unit 0' of ground troops to Europe under «rtiole 3 of tbe
North Atlant1c Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Statf shall oer

I

,

tity to the Seoretary of Defense that in their opinion the
parties to the North Atlantio Treaty are giving, and have
agreed to give

~ull,

realistic foroe and effect to the

requ1rement 'of article 3 of said treaty tha.t "by means
continuous and etfective
II

self~elp

of

and mutual a1d" they will

malntain and develop their individual and collective capa

oity to resist armed attaok," especiallY inso.tar as the cre

!

,I
j

ation of combat unit,s is

5.

oonoer~edj

the Senate herewith approves the understand1ng

that the major contribution to the ground forces under

I

.I

General Eisenhower's command'should be made by the European
members ot the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units
ot United States ground forces as ma.l be ass1gned to the

above command Shall be ass1gned only atter the J01nt Chiets
ot Staff cert1fy to the Seoretary ot Defense that in their

opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening
the secur1ty of the Un1ted States; and the certified op1n
ions reterred to in paragraphs 4 and '5 ,Shall be transmitted,
by the Secretary of Detense to the President ot the United
States, and to the Senate Committees on Fore1gn Relations
and Armed Services, and to the House Committee on Foreign

11~1i.1

....
il

,

I. . . .

""
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Affa1rs'and Armed Serv10es as soon as they are reoe1ved-,

6.

1t 1s the sense of the Senate that, 1n the lnter

ests ot sound oonstltut1onal prooesses, and of national
un1ty and understandlng, congresslonal approval should be
obtalned of any pollcy requ1ring the assignment ot
troops abroad when

su~h

Amer~oan

assignment 1s 1n lmplementat10n ot

artlcle 3 ot the North Atlant1c Treaty;

and the Senate

hereby approves the' present plans ot the Presldent and the
Jolnt Ohlets ot Statt to send tour additlonal dlvls10ns ot
ground toroes to Western Europe, but lt ls the sense ot the
Senate that no ground troops ln addltion to such tour dlvi
slons should be sent to Western Europe in implementatlon ot
artiole 3 ot the North Atlant10 Treaty Without further
oongresslonal approval;

, i.

it 1s the sense ot the Senate that the Presldent

should submlt to the Congress at lntervals of not more' than

6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantio
Treaty, inoluding such information as may be made aval1able
tor thls purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe:

g.

1t ls the sense of the Senate that

States should

s~ek

~he

Un1ted

to ellminate all provlsions ot the exlst

ing treaty wlth Italy whloh lmpose llmitations upon the
m1l1~ary

strength ot Italy and prevent the performance by

Italy ot her obligatlons under the North Atlantio Treaty to
oontribute to the full extent of her capaoity to the defense
of Western Europe;
"
\

•

9.

it 1s the sense of the Senate that oonsideration

should be given to the' revision ofplans for the defense ot
Europe as soon as possible so as to provide tor ut1,11zat1on
on a voluntary baals'of the. military and other resouroes ot
Western Germany

a~d

Spain, but not exolusive ot the m1l1tary

and other resouroes of other nations.

I

,

'

